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Introduction 
The words "necessary" and "needs" are both relative expressions, admitting in each case a 
considerable range of meaning. ± Lord Clyde1 
Despite routine reliance on NEED2 in legal invocations, there has been a disturbing misunderstanding 
concerning the concept. The misunderstanding of which I speak infects not only legal theory, but also 
judicial reasoning. In certain areas of law NEED is a core concept upon which a trial may hinge, 
determining liability or guilt of defendants. Accordingly, a strong understanding of the concept is 
necessary for the accurate assessment of such liability or guilt. Doubtful as it may seem on the face of 
it, alarming errors have occurred as a result of a disregard for the distinction between the intension 
and extension3 of NEED. The difficulties that beset NEED are the symptom of a potentially deep-rooted 
and pervasive problem; and my ambition is, in part, to prompt serious reconsideration of where and to 
what extent the mistakes I highlight may be committed elsewhere, in both legal theory and case law.  
In order to achieve this, I begin by attending to recent developments in legal conceptual analysis by 
%ULDQ%L[%L[¶VZRUNPLJKWUHDVRQDEO\EHWKRXJKWWRVWDQGDPRQJVWWKHEHVWZRUNWKHUHLVRQ
conceptual analysis in law, and I seek to demonstrate that it falls down in at least one disastrous way. 
My latter chapters investigate to what degree the application of legal principles has consequently been 
hindered, which invoke concepts that are not properly understood in theory, let alone practice. It is 
partly on this basis that I claim our attention needs to be brought to the errors in question; errors that 
are not unduly esoteric or solely academic, but have damaging practical consequences. Seemingly 
harmless mistakes in philosophy of language can be seen to seep into the invocation of legal 
principles, leading to unjustly damaged livelihoods and restrictions of liberty.  
The wide ambit my task poses requires my proof be narrowly scoped and succinct; I achieve this 
through focusing on NEED in particular,4 within both legal theory and law.5 Despite this necessary 
focus, I suggest the mistakes surrounding NEED warrant serious investigation elsewhere. The 
conclusions I delineate around NEED are compelling in their own light, yet my conclusions regarding 
                                                   
1
 [1997] 2 WLR 459 (HL) 610 
2
 When referring to concepts I indicate this with small caps, as done in Stephen Laurence, Eric Margolis, 
µ&RQFHSWVDQG&RQFHSWXDO$QDO\VLV¶3KLORVRSK\DQd Phenomenological Research 253  
3
 I provide a preliminary account of this pair shortly. Theories of intension and extension are traceable to 
Gottlob Frege, µ2Q6HQVHDQG5HIHUHQFH¶ILUVWSXEOLVKHG$:0RRUHHGMeaning and Reference OUP 
1993), and are developed significantly by Rudolf Carnap, Meaning and Necessity (University of Chicago Press 
1947). I go on to examine the relationship between these distinct but related theories in chapter two part III. 
4
 And, to a lesser extent, NECESSITY. 
5
 By which I mean cases, as opposed to legal theory.  
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this one concept raise the concern that the same errors are present in relation to other concepts6 in law 
and philosophy. NEED is simply the main vehicle in examining precisely what can go wrong when 
philosophers and judges disregard the value in separating a concept, and the various objects said 
concept can apply to in extension, when analysing legal, philosophical and linguistic issues.  
I reserve the detailed development of intension and extension for later. By way of preliminary 
explanation the intension of, say, PURPLE, is the qualities of being purple, the extension anything that 
which is capable of being purple. A plum can be the extension of PURPLE, or a car, etc. The range of 
all things in the world to which a concept or term applies is the extension. BALL has the intension of 
all internal aspects of BALL, representing the concept in abstract, unattached to any particular referent. 
The extension is all things that are capable of being referred to by BALL. IIVRPHRQHDVNVWRµget that 
ball¶ the extension is the individual ball being referred to, but the potential available extensions 
include all things in the world that are capable of being referred to as balls- tennis balls, basketballs, 
etc. This is how the distinction operates regarding concrete nouns, but this paper specifically handles 
abstract nouns; primarily NEED and NECESSITY, among others. The role of intension and extension 
with regard to these concepts is just as simple: the intension of NEED is the internal qualities that NEED 
possesses,7 and the extension that which it is capable of referring to. A concept need not refer to an 
actual physical object that exists in the physical world: in extension an abstract noun can attach to a 
referent which does not pick out any tangible object, bXWUHIHUVWRVRPHWKLQJDEVWUDFWO\LHµKHUQHHG
IRUORYH¶&OHDUO\WKLVLVFRQWH[WGHSHQGHQWLQDZD\WKDWLVQRWWKHFDVHZLWKconcrete nouns, and the 
various ways a proposition can be structured is capable of providing a practically limitless range of 
possible referents. The vastness of this range is capable of leading one, (prominent theorists, and 
judges, we will see), to become tied in linguistic knots, with no hope of untying them without 
appealing to a distinction between the concept itself, and the referent it has in extension. The strength 
of my argument lies partly in the fact that the division is straight forward enough to grasp, calling into 
question why there is not better notice taken in the relevant theory and case law.  
I will provide more general proof beyond NEED and consider contributions by other theorists.8 It is of 
note that instances of such writers are limited in numbers, particularly in recent years,9 and where they 
                                                   
6
 I also explore NECESSITY, COHERENCE, TRUTH and FREEDOM, and there is good reason to suppose this only 
begins to scratch the surface. 
7
 This is deliberately left vague. The precise formulation of what an intension consists of is not necessary for my 
investigation; needless to say I return to this point where appropriate, in chapter two part III. 
8
 The necessary diagnosis of how intension and extension can inform contemporary conceptual analysis has not 
been entirely overlooked in contemporary theory, though its consideration is surprisingly limited. I will draw on 
those who offer meaningful contributions to my analysis, largely in chapter two part II. 
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are present their considerations are restricted to legal theory only, while my claim concerns a balance 
of legal practice and legal theory. This balance is sought and maintained partly because it is, in the 
task I have set out, important to challenge and correct some dangerous and faulty reasoning put 
forward very recently in legal theory, before discerning how judicial reasoning may be better 
informed.10 It is for this reason that I devote chapter one to a comprehensive critique and rebuttal of 
the well-known article µ/DZDQG/DQJXDJH+RZ:RUGV0LVOHDG8V¶ by Brian Bix.11 As I will 
demonstrate%L[¶VFULticism of American alimony law is crippled by a mistake which can be 
completely resolved through close attention to the distinction between 1(('¶s intension, and what 
referents it is capable of attaching to in extension.12 This is the first substantial example I offer for my 
claim, specifically because it is a prime example of the error I wish to highlight; it is recent, in an 
important journal, and by a prominent contemporary philosopher. Beginning with this analysis 
straight away places my claim into the context of modern legal theory. It is worth noting that in order 
WREHVXFFLQFWDQGFOHDULQGHDOLQJZLWKWKHLVVXHVSURPSWHGE\P\DQDO\VLVRI%L[¶VDUWLFOH,UHVHUYH
consideration of many of the wider issues for later chapters, and occasionally prompt where this is the 
case. 
                                                                                                                                                              
9
 A relatively recent disregard for conceptual analysis within analytic philosophy may account somewhat for 
this, as opposed to a disregard for intension and extension specifically. Despite this, there has been a recent 
resurgence of interest in general conceptual analysis. SHH7RRUEHQ6SDDNµ%RRN5HYLHZ%ULDQ/HLWHU
1DWXUDOLVLQJ-XULVSUXGHQFH¶7KHRULDµW)e might continue with conceptual analysis if we 
were to adopt a more relaxed understanding of it, which does not involve appeal to a priori intuitions. For 
H[DPSOHZHPLJKWIROORZ)UDQN-DFNVRQZKRGHIHQGV³PRGHVW´FRQFHSWXDODQDO\VLVZKLFKDLPVWRGHWHUPLQH
QRWZKDWWKHZRUOGLVOLNHEXW³ZKat to say in less fundamental terms given an account of the world stated in 
PRUHIXQGDPHQWDOWHUPV´¶.  I speak more within on the decline/revival of conceptual analysis and how this 
pertains to intension and extension. 
10
 This raises the question of whether errors in legal theory hDYHFRQWULEXWHGWRWKHPLVWDNHµon the ground¶VR
to speak, in courts. The misconceptions of which I speak are present in legal theory where the specific concern 
is to analyse language; it is no surprise these misconceptions are being perpetuated by judges, who are not 
necessarily, (especially in lower courts), trained in philosophy of language. Additionally, judges have other 
practical concerns springing from the case before them, distinct from the relatively esoteric questions of 
meaning that conceptual analysis might raise. Though, as I will exhibit in chapter two, my position is not bound 
by issues that typically pertain to the pursuit of an esoteric or technical understanding of meaning. 
11
 Brian Bix, 'Law and Language: How Words Mislead Us' (2010) 1 Jurisprudence 25 
12
 Though, like a line of dominos, many other significant philosophical issues are prompted by my primary 
analysis. Where they are sufficiently relevant to my overall claim I will acknowledge and explore them to 
varying degrees, (at the least providing direction to relevant authors/discussion), partly through the use of 
footnotes. 
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Bix mistakenly identifies the satisfaction of µbasic minimal requirements of life¶13 as the 
µFRQYHQWLRQDO meaning¶14 of NEED despite being aware that NEED is predicated of something other 
than this in American alimony law.15 According to the conventional meaning that he ascribes to NEED, 
Bix goes on to criticise the use of the concept in American alimony law. I demonstrate that Bix has 
attached properties or features of what NEED is capable of being predicated and associated these 
properties or features with NEED itself, when it is not being used in a remotely similar context as to 
what Bix conceives the µconventional¶ meaning to be. 16  It is this error that leads him to conclude 
NEED LVLQVRPHZD\EHLQJµVWUHWFKHG¶17 in its use in American alimony law, and his conclusions are 
consequently misplaced. This raises a whole host of issues; I dissect precisely what difficulties Bix 
encounters under this misconception, and reel in and rectify the matters that orbit it.  It is not, as Bix 
purports, that NEED has a µconventional meaning¶ that is consistent with the particular extension he 
relies upon in claiming that NEED is unsuitable for use in American alimony law. Rather, it is that 
some referents, of which NEED is capable of being applied to in extension, are considered to be more 
important. By µPRUHLPSRUWDQW¶ I mean that one type of referent a concept is capable of attaching to in 
extension is given particular prominence in the mind of a theorist, and consequently all uses that do 
not cohere with this conception the theorist has in mind are deemed to be inappropriate uses of that 
concept. This is critical, and a main theme throughout this piece. To put the notion into a preliminary 
example, it may be said that the need for sufficient water to avoid dying of thirst is µmore important¶ 
than the need to get a taxi in order not to miss a dentist appointment, but this does not mean that it 
would be wrong WRVD\µ,QHHGDWD[L¶This will initially seem (highly) elementary, and it would be, 
were it not an oversight that is being committed in both theory and practice, with surprisingly invasive 
ramifications.  
I will also demonstrate how Bix makes the same and similar errors in relation to µIUHHGRPRI
FRQWUDFW¶. I consider this partly for the purpose of demonstrating the wider application of what is said 
regarding NEED, and just as much to help inform my analysis of NEED ZLWKLQ%L[¶VDUWLFOH for his 
                                                   
13
 Ibid 35 
14
 Ibid 36 
15
 %L[GRHVQRWXVHWKHWHUPLQRORJ\µLQWHQVLRQDQGH[WHQVLRQ¶QRUDQ\RWKHUPHDQVRIVLJQLI\LQJFRPSDULVRQ
between a concept and what that concept can be predicated of. It will become apparent why thinking along the 
lines of intension and extension provides a distinction that is more than an exercise in semantics, and how doing 
so reliably resolves conundrums which are otherwise elusive for philosophers.  
16
 Precisely ZKDWDµFRQYHQWLRQDOPHDQLQJ¶PLJKW EHLVQRWH[SORUHGLQDQ\GHSWKLQ%L[¶VDUWLFOHWKLV,ZLOOGHDO
with in due course.  
17
 µ+RZ:RUGV0LVOHDG8V¶ µ:LWKWKDWXQGHUVWDQGLQJVXGGHQO\DOLPRQ\LVXQGHUVWRRGDVDn entitlement rather 
WKDQFKDULW\ZHQRORQJHUKDYHWRVWUHWFKWKHZRUGµQHHG¶WRFRYHUPLGGOHFODVVDQGXSSHUFODVVVWDQGDUG-of-
OLYLQJSD\PHQWV¶ 36 
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treatment of NEED is not entirely self-contained and reference to the rest of the article is necessitated 
in fully understanding his claim.   
Chapter two provides a background to the philosophical ideas discussed in this thesis and draws on 
other relevant theorists, both past and contemporary. Here I deal with general issues or objections my 
investigation may appear to give rise to, and present a wider account of the issues at hand, (following 
the relative specificity of chapter one, and the later chapters). It splits into three parts, the first of 
which discusses how the notion of talking past one another is relevant to my considerations, and 
addresses why it is that Bix and I are not falling into this particular philosophical trap. And also, why I 
conduct the analysis I do, and in what way one µconceptual theory¶ can be µbetter¶ than another. To 
VD\µEHWWHU¶, DQGµFRQFHSWXDOWKHRU\¶, KHUHLVWRXVH%L[¶VWHUPLQRORJ\18 from his older article, 
Conceptual Questions and Jurisprudence.19 It is through this established framework that the 
FRQFHSWXDODQDO\VLV,RIIHULQUHVSRQVHWR%L[¶VWUHDWPHQWRINEED is, in fact, µbetter¶.20 Part II of the 
chapter examines in closer detail how the ideas advocated in relation to NEED are transferable to other 
concepts. I do this throughout the thesis; the key difference here is I specifically investigate the work 
of other theorists who make similar claims to mine in different fields, particularly with attention to 
research conducted by Stephen Pethick21 on COHERENCE and Susan Haack on TRUTH.22 
Part III examines how intension and extension relate to other philosophical divisions of a similar 
nature. Here I also justify why concerns surrounding µmeaning¶, which traditionally hold to the 
                                                   
18
 µ7KHTXHVWLRQUHPDLQVRQZKDWEDVLVFDQLWEHDVVHUWHGWKDWRQHFRQFHSWXDOWKHRU\LVEHWWHUWKDQDQRWKHU"¶
%ULDQ%L[µ&RQFHSWXDO4XHVWLRQVDQG-XULVSUXGHQFH¶ Legal Theory (1995) 1 465 470 
19
 As well Brian Leiter in Naturalising Jurisprudence 283µ,IDSURSRVHGFRQFHSWXDODQDO\VLVLVWREH
preferred to others, it must be because it earns its place by facilitating successful a posteriori theories of law and 
legal institutions «In other words, what would ultimately vindicate the conceptual arguments for Hard 
3RVLWLYLVPLVQRWVLPSO\WKHDVVHUWLRQWKDWWKH\DFFRXQWIRUWKH³UHDO´FRQFHSWRIODZEXWWKDt the concept of law 
they best explicate is the one that figures in the most fruitful a posteriori research programs, i.e., the ones that 
JLYHXVWKHEHVWJRLQJDFFRXQWRIKRZWKHZRUOGZRUNV¶. 134  
20
 This is not to make a general argument about subjective and objective truth; simply to note that Bix and I are 
both referencing NEED in a context where our competing conceptions directly contrast, and cannot both be true 
due to this. For a general and thorough account of these separate issues see Simon Blackburn, Truth: A Guide 
for the Perplexed (first published Allen Lane 2005, Penguin Books 2006) 
21
 While his treatment is strictly in relation to COHERENCE, and the treatment of COHERENCE in theoretical works, 
3HWKLFN¶V critical commentary in relation to the neglect of intension and extension is well worth close attention. 
Not least due to the fact he is the only contemporary philosopher to provide a direct treatment for some of the 
issues neglecting intension and extension, albeit in a relatively niche area. 
22
 µ7KH8QLW\RI7UXWKDQGWKH3OXUDOLW\RI7UXWKV¶3ULQFLSLD 
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analytic school of philosophy, do not bind my position.23 My claim does not depend on, nor do I 
pursue, some technical, use based, or esoteric understanding of meaning.24 I treat a more fundamental 
issue than questions that surround the notion of meaning or intension: the relationship such 
meanings/intensions/conceptions have with the particular referents of which they are capable of being 
predicated, and a lack of appreciation for this relationship. Ultimately if one subscribes to the idea that 
a concept has a definition25 and a plethora of potential referents, then one also commits to the 
intension and extension distinction as far as my analysis is concerned.  
Chapter three reviews needs assessments within the provision of community care, and begins to 
provide more compelling evidence that the error I identify is not limited to legal theory,26 but is 
demonstrable as causing difficulties in judicial reasoning. Through manipulation of what NEED is 
predicated of within needs assessments it is possible to illegitimately shift the legal responsibility of 
local authorities onto safe ground. I draw on a few crucial cases which fill out this landscape: 
R(McDonald) v Royal Borough of Kensington & Chelsea ,27 R v Gloucestershire CC Ex P Barry28 and 
R v Kirklees Ex P Daykin29 to show that, firstly, the reliability of needs assessments is under threat 
due to a lack of attention to the intension and extension of NEED in these assessments.30 Secondly, and 
VLPLODUO\LQDVVHVVLQJDSDWLHQW¶VQHHGWKHDYDLODELOLW\RIUHVRXUFHVLVPHDQWWREHirrelevant, at least 
                                                   
23
 ,W¶VQRWIHDVLEOHRUQHFHVVDU\WRSURYLGHDGHWDLOHGDQDO\VLVRIWKLVWUDGLWLRQDOSXUVXLWRIFRQFHSWXDODQDO\VLV
within analytic philosophy. The inquiries by logical positivists, early Wittgenstein, Bertrand Russell, etc, 
dominate 20th Century thought in this area but efforts to seek the answers, (or lack thereof), to metaphysical 
questions of meaning are distinctly irrelevant to my claims here.  
24
 Such as that put forward by Bertrand RXVVHOOLQµ2Q'HQRWLQJ¶Mind DQG6WUDZVRQµ2Q
5HIHUULQJ¶ Mind 539, as well others I go on to discuss.   
25
 What intension constitutes in a precise way is not of particular interest within the scope of this analysis, and I 
explore why in some detail. For present purposes, it is sensible to regard it as the concept itself in abstract (that 
is, unattached to a referent). The vast literature surrounding precisely what constitutes an intension (i.e. as 
discussed by Carnap in Meaning and Necessity (UCP 1947) and Hilary PXWQDPLQµ7KH0HDQLQJRI³0HDQLQJ´¶
(1975) 7 Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 131) does not hold to my argument. 
26
 Worthwhile jurisprudence informs legal practice, and I do not intend to demean its importance; if a problem 
occurs in cases, and can be traced to or explained by legal theory, it is a problem that needs attention. 
27
 [2011] UKSC 33 
28
 [1997] 2 WLR 459 (HL) 
29
 [1996] EWCA Civ J1126-5 
30
 It may initially seem there is overlap here with theories of judicial interpretation (see Andrei Marmor, 
Interpretation and Legal Theory (2nd edn Hart 2005); As I will show though the matter is not one of preferring 
literal (see Grey v Pearson [1857] 6 HL Cas 61) over the golden rule (see R v Allen (1872) LR 1 CCR 367), etc, 
but simply that taking the original needs assessment at anything other than its specific interpretation renders it 
effectively unreliable as a means of protecting patient treatment. 
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initially; yet the relied upon method of distinguishing between identifying a need and meeting a need31 
is not fully understood in achieving this aim, while intension and extension suitably informs its 
application. Needs assessments can be pronouncedly more influenced by resource availability over an 
honest DVVHVVPHQWRIDSDWLHQW¶VQHHG, where such consideration is legally intended to be separate, if 
acute attention to the intension and extension of NEED is not maintained.  
Finally, chapter four examines the role of NECESSITY in the defence of necessity, drawing on the well-
known case R v Dudley and Stephens,32 and others, which involved the killing and eating of a cabin 
boy during a shipwreck. Legal treatment of NECESSITY in law contributes further evidence of the wide 
applicability of what I put forward and the arguments this paper makes in relation to NEED extend 
naturally to NECESSITY. Fundamentally, both concepts have a lot hanging on their appropriate legal 
application, through the implementation of legal principles that rely on a strong understanding of the 
concepts they invoke. Mistakes in this application regarding both NEED and NECESSITY can cause 
similar difficulties in jurisprudence and cases. While I consider how intension and extension may 
inform a variety of concepts other than NEED, in order to show the wide applicability of my theory, the 
affinity shared between NEED and NECESSITY in linguistics and logic33 make it a particularly lucrative 
focus point. This consideration is enhanced by the role that both concepts share as modal operators, 
and I examine the implications of this relationship.  
Furthermore, devoting space to NECESSITY allows me to investigate, from a different angle, how 
theorists and judges may be misled by a particular preferred use of a concept they find more 
important34 when compared to its other possible applications. I push further the idea that particular 
preferred invocations, %L[SKUDVHVKLVDVWKHµFRQYHQWLRQDOPHDQLQJ¶, are given to concepts simply 
because the proponent of the preferred invocation has a distinct referent in mind, (different to the one 
actually in use), which they consider to be particularly important. This consideration is enhanced by 
judicial commentary surrounding the defence of necessity in criminal law as µlHJDOO\DFFHSWDEOH¶
extensions35 of NECESSITY within the defence are extremely limited, and limited to objectively 
                                                   
31
 The method employed by the courts and care providers: Barry [1997] 2 WLR 459 (HL) 
32
 (1884) 14 Q.B.D. 273  
33
 Carnap, Meaning and Necessity: µ:HIRUPWKHPRGDOV\VWHP6IURPRXUHDUOLHUV\VWHP6E\WKHDGGLWLRQRI
WKHPRGDOVLJQµ1¶IRUORJLFDOQHFHVVLW\:HUHJDUGDSURSRVLWLRQDVQHFHVVDU\LIDQ\VHQWHQFHH[SUHVVLQJLWLV/-
true. Other modalities can bHGHILQHGLQWHUPVRIQHFHVVLW\IRUH[DPSOHLPSRVVLELOLW\SRVVLELOLW\FRQWLQJHQF\¶
173 
34
 Due to their extreme or urgent nature, such as the threat of serious harm or death. 
35
 Extensions of necessity that, if they can be demonstrated to be factually consistent with the case through 
evidence, will allow the defence to apply. Or, put otherwise, the circumstances in which one can sometimes use 
the defence are limited to extreme circumstances; usually loss of life or serious injury: R v Willer (1986) 83 Cr 
App R 225  
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important extensions36 only. Judicial understanding and commentary around precisely in what 
circumstances the defence of necessity might apply is significantly firmer when compared to how the 
courts handle the wide applicability of needs assessments, in contrast. Judges demonstrate a 
reasonable understanding of the application of the defence, and an awareness of the implications of 
mistakes. I draw the conclusion that the manipulation of language is less common and less likely in 
dealing with the defence since its invocation is highly restricted, and restricted to exclusively 
important referents, (such as preventing death). Fortunately, despite it not currently being present, this 
awareness is achievable in all legal uses of both NEED and NECESSITY, even where the potential 
variable extensions are extremely diverse, as is the case with needs assessments, considered in chapter 
three. It is achievable by carefully considering the intension and relevant extension of the concept 
being relied upon, and I will demonstrate how this is the case.  
Worryingly though, this improved judicial understanding within the defence of necessity may be due 
to a more sinister reason than first meets the eye. What we can say with certainty is the judges 
generally commit fewer linguistic oversights within the defence of necessity, yet this may not be due 
to actual awareness of the philosophical issues by the judges themselves. It may instead be that the 
issues which otherwise show themselves elsewhere are simply invisible, hidden by the legal 
limitations of the defence. If judges are not required to apply the defence beyond a highly restricted, 
and objectively important, context (protecting life), there is no cause for the mistakes I explore to ever 
reveal themselves. This, rather than being reason for relief as one might initially imagine, is a 
formidable concern; the potential consequences are much more subtle, and can not be ignored. They 
are twofold: should the defence ever be expanded to include a wider variety of referents, the issues 
that currently lie dormant would be awoken in relying on the defence in any new context. Moreover, 
(and necessarily speculatively), if NECESSITY is misconceived by judges as being primarily reserved 
for these limited invocations, the development of the defence in common law to protect defendants in 
other contexts may be unduly restricted to these invocations only. It is not suitable to say more of this 
before we develop the theory through chapters one to three first, as it rests on this basis. Due to these 
reasons, and the fact the defence of necessity is an area of law that has much hanging on effective 
communication,37 (and consequently is worth investigation in its own right), it is worth close 
consideration. 
Primarily considering a concept such as NEED allows my investigation to be focused, achievable and 
clear; yet can still offer compelling conclusions in a much wider way. Concepts can be simply tested 
                                                   
36
 The defence can only typically be relied on when life is in danger or serious injury is imminent: R v Kitson 
[1955] 39 Cr App R 66 
37
 In some of the cases I consider, it is literally a matter of life and death. Contemporarily, it can be the 
difference between life imprisonment or freedom. 
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against the distinction to determine its success or failure once explored in thorough detail to a few 
examples. Once my claim is properly explored through the precise disambiguation of some key legal 
concepts, it is possible to investigate problems besetting conceptual analysis using this distinction 
with remarkable ease.38 And at an increasing rate, it makes more sense to do so the deeper into the 
quandary we go.  
The examples I provide are just some of the prominent areas in which problems may arise in 
jurisprudential literature and legal cases. Although necessarily limited in order to ensure sufficient 
depth of analysis, they permeate many areas of law. Through these, my considerations include family, 
contract, public and criminal law. These instances will be sufficient consideration for my point to be 
well made, the practical limitations of this thesis require me to limit my investigation into specific 
areas, and these areas give as wide a scope as is possible in ensuring sufficient depth of analysis as to 
reach reasonable and thorough conclusions.  
Thus, there are two primary tasks undertaken in this thesis. Firstly, to identify and rectify the 
immediate misconceptions NEED and NECESSITY suffer in both legal theory and the application of 
legal principles. Secondly, and equally as importantly, to prompt serious reconsideration of the 
pervasiveness and depth of the errors in question; while there is cause for concern in the specific 
examples I am able to analyse in depth, where, and to what extent, the mistakes I highlight may be 
committed elsewhere is equally as troubling. My claim is not, of course, that all of legal theory and 
judicial practice are guilty of the mistakes I highlight, though the evidence I provide suggests that 
investigation into the relevant literature is warranted. The structure of this piece reflects these two 
closely related aims: chapter one provides us with specific evidence in contemporary legal theory, 
chapter two leads us through the wider points brought up by my inquiry; backing up chapter one and 
setting up investigation into case law for chapter three and four. We will see how legal reasoning is 
compromised in important contexts due to seemingly esoteric philosophical and linguistic issues. This 
prevailing aim naturally splits into many avenues, and I have briefly set the path I will take in this 




                                                   
38
 That is, linguistic issues that we might otherwise entertain as legitimate are seen to be a simple muddling of 
the relevant concept and what that concept is capable of attaching to. 
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Chapter One ± µ1HHG¶ in Legal Theory 
Part I- Picking up the Bix and Pieces 
In an article for Jurisprudence entitled µLaw and Language: How Words Mislead Us¶39 Brian Bix 
seeks WRµexplore some of the ways in which we have been led astray, particularly in contract and 
family law, by our legal language¶40  DQGZDUQVRIWKHGDQJHUµthat inaccurate language can so easily 
change our substantive views about what is natural or what is right¶41 Our aims are strikingly similar, 
though our conclusions greatly differ. A thorough understanding of language use and legal concepts is 
important, and more needs to be done in order to be clear on why we often encounter problems with 
them, and where appropriate resolve them. Bix¶VFRQWULEXWLRQV represent a large body of work within 
analytic legal theory in which this clarity is pursued; a large portion of which invokes methods and 
ideas from philosophy of language to solve perceived problems. I am in full agreement with this 
overarching aim. The article in question sweeps across numerous concepts, but I focus particularly on 
its criticisms on the application of NEED in alimony law.  
Bix¶VHUURUOLes in the association of features evoked by a singular possible extension of NEED, in one 
isolated example of which he ascribes particular importance, and the imputation of these features onto 
NEED itself when it is predicated of a different object entirely.42 Or, put otherwise, one particular 
extension of NEED is considered important enough that other applications of the concept which fall 
outside of it are purportedly problematic. This mistake can be separated into general stages. Though 
each stage takes considerable analysis, a general framework is of use, and will prevent tunnel vision 
as we embark into the tighter detail. Firstly, a preferred, particular invocation of a concept, (for Bix, 
NEED), is identified, that is considered to be especially important. Secondly, the features of this 
preferred invocation are brought to mind, (for Bix, it is the connotations/emotive associations he 
encounters within his preferred invocation). Thirdly, these features are transferred onto the concept 
itself, as opposed to the particular referent that initially evoked those features. Finally, the originally 
flexible and well understood concept is tainted in applications that are not consistent with the features 
of one, seemingly random and personal, referent that concept might occasionally have. 
                                                   
39
 µ7KLVDUWLFOHLVEDVHGRn the Reappointment Lecture to the Frederick W Thomas Chair for the Interdisciplinary 
Study of Law and Language, given at the University of Minnesota on 7 April 2009. I am grateful for the 
comments and suggestions of Sean Coyle and those present at the LecWXUH¶ 
40
 Ibid 26 
41
 Ibid 38 
42
 I use object in its wider abstract sense as to include metaphysical objects, such as propositions NEED may be 
predicated of. 
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I will examine why it may be the case that Bix, and others, attempt to restrict NEED¶S use to something 
like µbasic minimal requirements of life¶, and conclude that it is not that NEED KDVDµFRQYHQWLRQDO
PHDQLQJ¶ consistent with this particular extension, but rather meeting basic minimal requirements of 
life is just one of the more important referents in extension NEED is capable of having. All I mean by a 
µPRUHLPSRUWDQW¶UHIHUHQWLVWKHUHODWLYHLPSRUWDQFHWKDWLVDVFULEHGWRDparticular referent in the 
world when that concept is brought to mind. For instance, it is surely generally accepted that a 
community need for sufficient clean water is more important than a need for golf courses. But both 
these are capable of being described as being needed depending on which proposition NEED is 
predicated.43  7KHµPRUHLPSRUWDQW¶UHIHUHQWVNEED might have say little about circumstances in which 
NEED does not have these referents, and its use in WKHVHRWKHUµXQLPSRUWDQW¶ contexts is not a 
µstretch¶44 of the concept. We may say I need her in my life, or that someone needs help or they will 
die and certainly these circumstances are capable of being important, but to associate the sense of 
urgency and importance within these circumstances with NEED itself45 (or the intension of NEED), in 
all its instantiations, leads to untenable conclusions of the kind Bix puts forward and errors in 
reasoning that can haunt legal trials. This difficulty encountered in relation to NEED, (and, as chapter 
two and four investigate, NEED is not alone in this), can be properly elucidated by distinguishing the 
intension and extension of the concept. Firstly Bix identifies that NEED is capable of referring to a 
PHHWLQJRIµEDVLFPLQLPDOUHTXLUHPHQWVRIOLIH¶, and that this is iWVµFRQYHQWLRQDOPHDQLQJ¶+Hmakes 
the loose link that historically alimony law was used partly to prevent destitution for the recipient. In 
accordance with this premise Bix notes that in American alimony law NEED is used in a way not 
consistent with this µFRQYHQWLRQDOPHDQLQJ¶OHDGLQJKLPWRFRQFOXGHWKDW NEED LVEHLQJµVWUHWFKHG¶46 
in American alimony law. He offers various different concepts to use in its place. In response, I claim 
that Bix makes the mistake of associating properties of one possible extension of NEED (basic minimal 
requirements of life) with its intension in circumstances where NEED is predicated of a different 
                                                   
43
 I return to the issue of necessary and contingent truths, prompted somewhat by this consideration, in chapter 
four part I. See Leibniz, Primary Truths (first published 1689, Hackett Publishing Co 2000) 275 and Discourse 
on Metaphysics (first published 1686, Hackett Publishing Co 2000) 234. For commentary, see Abdul Muhit 
µ/HLEQL]RQ1HFHVVDU\DQG&RQWLQJHQW7UXWKV¶$UWV)DFXOW\-RXUQDO 
44
 µ+RZ:RUGV0LVOHDG8V¶ 36 
45
 :KHQ,VD\µLWVHOI¶,GRQRWPHDQWRVXJJHVWWKDWWKHVHFRQFHSWVH[LVWLQDQ\PHWDSK\VLFDOVHQVHPHUHO\WKDW
there is a genuine difference between a concept and what it is capable of applying to. It is worth noting here that 
in chapter two part III I deal with any potential problems that may arise from difficulties surrounding the 
meaning, or intension, or conception of a concept.  
46
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proposition entirely (living to the same quality of life as the ex-spouse did within the marriage). I 
suggest that %L[¶VPLVXQGerstanding is due to the fact that some extensions that NEED is capable of 
having are considered more important than others, but this is to say nothing of the concept NEED or its 
appropriateness in other contexts when not predicated of these referents. It is only to say something of 
the object that NEED is predicated of in the real world: the need of avoiding death, being happy or 
healthy, etc.47  
7KHFRQFHUQRIµ/DZDQG/DQJXDJH+RZ:RUGV0LVOHDG8V¶  is consistent with its title, yet a 
disregard for intension and extension has led to significant philosophical errors surrounding important 
legal concepts in an article that is specifically written to deal with conceptual analysis in legal theory. 
The mistakes made in judicial commentary, considered later in this paper, are worrying in their own 
right. But these judgments do not have the principal aim of deliberately exploring the relevant 
language philosophy; they are to solve and decide upon a case that is presented before them.48 %L[¶V
article has a focus on conceptual analysis; yet clear, established, philosophical principles are not 
properly considered to the detriment of the conceptual analysis within. It is little wonder that courts 
may operate under damaging misconceptions if those misconceptions are propagated by prominent 
specialists.  
This chapter will be structured in a way thaWGHDOVZLWK%L[¶VWUHDWPHQWRINEED first, and following 
this it will be necessary to briefly explore a few key issues that are explored in the rest of %L[¶Varticle. 
This will be to the extent that this consideration can helpfully inform my analysis of NEED and 
demonstrate how the points may apply to other concepts. This focus is necessitated by the practical 
limits of this thesis, but it would also be to the detriment of the analysis in this chapter if I were not to 
pay some attention to the rest of the article with a, limited, holistic approach. This would be the case 
with almost any analysis, the only exceptions being self-contained chapters which stand on their own 
without reIHUHQFHWRWKHUHVWRIWKHDUWLFOH+RZHYHUWKLVLVIDUIURPWKHFDVHZLWKµLaw and Language: 
How Words Mislead Us¶ and the argument that is common throughout the whole article is not 
explicitly stated with regard to NEED. Perhaps more importantly, this thesis is born of a desire to 
explore how intension and extension can help inform conceptual analysis, rather than from some 
                                                   
47
 Rather than, for instance, needing a nap, a massage or a taxi. Concepts are necessarily vague, versatile and 
variable, dependent on a practically limitless source of referents. It is unfounded to suggest that developed legal 
terminology be changed based on these personal associations one may have. I take this into more detail further 
in.  
48
 Noting the aim of an author as primarily being conceptual does not say anything about the severity of the 
consequences of any errors. Some errors in case law have consequences that are directly assessable, (such as a 
claim failing unjustly or a defendant being wrongly convicted), while consequences of mistaken analysis in the 
governing theory is more indirect; but not necessarily less serious.  
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abstract interest in NEED. Accordingly it is beneficial in making the points I do to consider how the 
ideas expressed here in relation to NEED may transfer to other concepts.  
Initial clarifications and introductory remarks made, we can now evidence and examine precisely how 
%L[¶VDQDO\VLVLVXQVDWLVIDFWRU\This is how Bix introduces his analysis of NEED: 
 
Many courts began to speak of alimony being appropriate where, and to the extent 
WKDWWKHUHFLSLHQWVSRXVHDOPRVWDOZD\VWKHZLIHFRXOGSURYHµQHHG¶7KLVLVWKH 
terminology and rhetoric that one finds in a large proportion of alimony cases to this 
very day. However, in the vast maMRULW\RIWKRVHFDVHVµQHHG¶LVQRWXVHGLQD 
conventional way. The court does not inquire into whether a spouse has been left 
without the means to meet even basic minimal requirements of life49 
One of the problems that I will discuss may be apparent after just this brief extract, and that is the 
assumption that when invoking the concept NEED one conventionally is using it to describe meeting 
µHYHQEDVLFPLQLPDOUHTXLUHPHQWVRIOLIH¶7KLVLVDKLJKO\TXHVWLRQDEOHDVVXPSWLRQDQGWKHUHVWRI
%L[¶VDQDO\VLVGoes not consider it any further, yet depends upon it. Thus it is one of the main 
problems besetting his analysis.  
He almost immediately goes on to say: 
%HFDXVHµQHHG¶LVXVHGLQDOLPRQ\FDVHV in a way that sharply differs from the conventional 
meaning of that term50 
As we just saw, the conventional meaning of NEED XQGHU%L[¶VDQDO\VLVLVPHHWLQJµHYHQEDVLF 
PLQLPDOUHTXLUHPHQWVRIOLIH¶Practically no justification for this conventional meaning is supplied, 
and %L[¶VLQVLVWHQFHRQFRQYHQWLRQDVVRPHWKLQJ(presumably), to do with meaning is central to his 
argument, but lies without general definition or defence. This can be distinguished from what his 
conception of the conventional use of NEED might actually be, WKDWLVVRPHWKLQJWRGRZLWKµEDVLF
minimal UHTXLUHPHQWVRIOLIH¶,WLVRQHWKLQJWRFULWLFLVH%L[¶VXQGHUVWDQGLQJRIZKHWKHUNEED is 
being used conventionally or not (which I go on to do in the next paragraph), another entirely for him 




 Ibid %L[XVHVWKHH[SUHVVLRQµWKHWHUP1(('¶ DQG,µWKHFRQFHSW1(('¶. Nothing of significance hangs on 
this for our purposes; whichever one employs the points remain the same. Commentary on their relation can be 
IRXQGLQSDSHUV,FRQVLGHULQFKDSWHUWZRSDUW,,$QGUHZ+DOSLQ¶Vµ&RQFHSWV7HUPVDQG)LHOGVRI(QTXLU\¶
(1998) 4 LT 187 and Stephen /DXUHQFH(ULF0DUJROLVµ&RQFHSWVDQG&RQFHSWXDO$QDO\VLV¶
3KLORVRSK\DQG3KHQRPHQRORJLFDO5HVHDUFKµ7KLVWHUPLQRORJ\LVSHUIHFWO\KDUPOHVVVRZH¶OOFRQWLQXHWR
follow Jackson in moving back and forth between claims about concepts and claLPVDERXWODQJXDJH¶ 
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to establish that convention plays the role he expects it to in meaning. It may do, but the idea is not 
explained or defended, making this relationship between convention and meaning difficult to 
comment on further. 
The conventional application of NEED WRWKHUHIHUHQFHµEDVLFPLQLPDOUHTXLUHPHQWVRIOLIH¶LV
problematic DQGVLWVZLWKRXWGHYHORSPHQWRUGHIHQFHZLWKLQ%L[¶VDUWLFOH. Many commonplace 
SKUDVHVPXVWIDOORXWVLGHWKLVVFRSHIRUH[DPSOHµ,QHHGILYHSLHFHVRIIUXLWRUYHJHWDEOHVDGD\¶RUµ,
QHHGHLJKWKRXUVVOHHSHYHU\QLJKW¶\HWWKHVHRUVLPLODUO\H[Sressed phrases) are surely conventional 
uses of the concept NEED,WLVQRWDµEDVLFPLQLPDOUHTXLUHPHQWRIOLIH¶WREHYHU\ZHOOQRXULVKHGRU
consistently well rested, but we would happily say we need these things. This is because we would be 
depending on the reference of our application of NEED. We would, in proposing such propositions, not 
EHFODLPLQJµ,QHHGHLJKWKRXUVVOHHSHYHU\QLJKWWRVDWLVI\P\EDVLFPLQLPDOUHTXLUHPHQWRIOLIH¶:H
ZRXOGUDWKHUEHVD\LQJVRPHWKLQJOLNHµ,QHHGHLJKWKRXUVVOHep every night if I am to be alert at 
work consisteQWO\¶RUVRPHWKLQJDNLQWRWKLVVKLIWLQJWKHUHIHUHQWLQH[WHQVLRQIRUNEED in each 
particular context. Language is flexible,51 and concepts can be used in multiple ways. Bix is, 
obviously, aware that NEED is used in these other contexts as well (making his conclusions somewhat 
baffling). That Bix ascribes NEED this conventional meaning is the first step in resolving the confusion 
he encounters. IWLVQHFHVVDU\WRLGHQWLI\%L[¶VDSSURDFKWRNEED as having a µFRQYHQWLRQDOPHDQLQJ¶
and examine, as far as possible, what this is supposed to be. It is the characteristics of this 
conventional meaning that he applies to NEED itself, even in circumstances where NEED is predicated 
of something else entirely than what Bix considers to be the conventional meaning.  
Let us explore some preliminary instantiations of the concept NEED and assess whether they 
FRUUHVSRQGZLWK%L[¶Vconventional conception,IRQHZHUHWRVD\µ,QHHGWRILOOP\QDPHRQWKH
register- may I borrRZ\RXUSHQ"¶ZHZRXOGFHUWDLQO\EHGHYLDWLQJIURPWKHGHILQLWLRQRIIHUHGE\%L[
WKDWLVXQGHUVFUXWLQ\KHUH2Uµ,QHHGWRJHWWKHQLQHR¶FORFNWUDLQRU,ZLOOEHVWXFNLQ&DQWHUEXU\¶. If 
these basic invocations to be presumed as unconventional, then this must be addressed by Bix, rather 
than his citing of a particular preference of 1(('¶Vuse and baldly asserting it as the conventional one. 
                                                   
51
 And necessarily vague, as I will speak mRUHRIODWHU:LWWJHQVWHLQSXWLWVRµ,I,WHOOVRPHRQH6WDQGURXJKO\
here"²may not this explanation work perfectly? And cannot every other one fail too? But isn't it an inexact 
explanation?²Yes; why shouldn't we call it "inexact"? Only let us understand what "inexact" means. For it does 
not mean "unusable". And let us consider what we call an "exact" explanation in contrast with this one. Perhaps 
something like drawing a chalk line round an area? Here it strikes us at once that the line has breadth. So a 
colour-edge would be more exact. But has this exactness still got a function here: isn't the engine idling? And 
remember too that we have not yet defined what is to count as overstepping this exact boundary; how, with what 
LQVWUXPHQWVLWLVWREHHVWDEOLVKHG$QGVRRQ¶Philosophical Investigations (first published 1953, Wiley-
Blackwell 2009) 88 
- 17 - 
 
One may think that the context in which Bix considers NEED (that of American alimony law, 
henceforth AAL), justifies the claim offered by Bix here. However, this is not the case; consider this 
next extract: 
:KHQWKHFRXUWVVSHDNRIVSRXVDOµQHHG¶LQDOLPRQ\FDVHWKHUHIHUHQFHLVRIWHQ 
indirectly, to the standard of living within the marriage. A long-term spouse is held 
basically to have a right to something like the quality of life she or he enjoyed during 
the marriage, and may receive alimony if his or her income-earning capacity will 
not rise near that level after the marriage is over.52 
The extension of NEED in AAL is not the conventional one that Bix associates with NEED, as the 
above passage shows, %L[VD\VKLPVHOIWKDWLWLVXVXDOO\µWRWKHVWDQGDUGRIOLving within the 
PDUULDJH¶. If the above is the reference of NEED in the context of alimony law53 then it is perfectly 
VHQVLEOHWRVD\VRPHWKLQJRIWKHOLNH³LQRUGHUWRPDLQWDLQWKHVDPHTXDOLW\RIOLIHWKHH[-spouse 
HQMR\HGGXULQJWKHPDUULDJHKHVKHZLOOQHHG[DPRXQWRIFXUUHQF\¶A NH\ZRUGKHUHLVµLQGLUHFWO\¶ 
To invoke the concept NEED in a sentence one requires a referent, either implicitly or explicitly.  To 




In the former instance the referent is implicit; presumably it is to meet for an appointment of some 
kind, or the speaker just does not wish to wait for an hour in a stationWKHIDFWLVZHGRQ¶WNQRZZKDW
it is without context. In the second example we are told the extension of which NEED relies: to stay 
awake till 3am. What is common through both examples is that NEED is either being used sensibly or 
not54 based on the extension being employed7KDWLVLWLVVHQVLEOHWRVD\µ,DPWLUHGHQRXJKWKDW,
need WRKDYHDFRIIHHWRVWD\DZDNHWLOODP¶EHFDXVHWKHUHTXLUHPHQWWKDWLQYRNLng NEED expresses in 
that context is suitably satisfied by having a coffee. In many instances of NEED the extension is simply 
not directly, or explicitly, stated, resulting in the SRVVLELOLW\RIVXEVWLWXWLQJRQH¶VRZQ µFRQYHQWLRQDO¶ 
conception in place of the one intended by the speaker; based on some vague association of 







 That is, it is either true or not depending on whether the contingent elements of the proposition are satisfied. (I 
speak more of truth-functionality in chapter four part I). 
- 18 - 
 
importance to a particular extension NEED is capable of having.55 %L[¶VXVHRINEED as a satisfaction 
RIWKHµEDVLFPLQLPDOUHTXLUHPHQWVRIOLIH¶falls into this framework.  
This indirect nature of 1(('¶s possible referents is possibly part of the reason that %L[¶VPLVWDNHVDUH
made, though this would be strange since he acknowledges the intended referent of NEED in AAL as 
being inconsistent with his own conventional conception. For Bix, the problem goes much deeper 
than this initial consideration, though it is not hard to imagine the way in which NEED is regularly 
employed²without explicit mention of the referent²is partly why errors manifest as they do. Of 
course, in normal conversation such clarity is hardly necessary; it is when a thorough and technical 
understanding is needed to apply the law that this is useful. I illustrate this point around indirect 
referents, compared with direct referents, in more detail in chapter four part II, where the issue 
becomes more relevant. 
That NEED is not being used in a conventional way is not argued sufficiently or anywhere near 
comprehensively enough for %L[¶V assumption that µµnHHG¶is being used in a way that sharply differs 
from the conventional meanLQJRIWKDWWHUP¶.56 Nor is it demonstrated by Bix that the loose idea of 
conventional use is in some way the measure of the appropriate meaning of a concept. Yet %L[¶V 
claim depends on both these points being accepted. So, before we even reach the deeper, general, 
philosophical error he makes, two of the legs upon which his position stands crumble under a 
relatively low level of scrutiny. He argues, in support of these claims, that alimony law is the 
³KLVWRULFDOUHVLGXHRIDWLPHZKHQWKHYDVWPDMRULW\RIwomen had no practical means of supporting 
WKHPVHOYHVLQWKH0DUNHWSODFH´,57 and goes on to explain:  
When a movement arose to make divorce more easily accessible²if only on fault 
grounds, to the innocent and wronged spouse²one practical µQHFHVVLW\¶ was to create 
some provision for the wives (at least the innocent ones). Otherwise, divorce would 
leave wives destitute«Time passed, and alimony, this residue of a historical period, 
continued, even if only granted in a small fraction of divorces. However, a new justification 
was sought. Many courts began to speak of alimony being appropriate where, and to the 
H[WHQWWKDWWKHUHFLSLHQWVSRXVHDOPRVWDOZD\VWKHZLIHFRXOGSURYHµQHHG¶«+RZHYHULQ
WKHYDVWPDMRULW\RIWKRVHFDVHVµQHHG¶LVQRWXVHGLQDFRQYHQWional way. The court does not 
enquire into whether a spouse has been left without the means to meet even basic minimal 
requirements of life58 
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 Ibid 35 
58
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Simply noting that historically alimony law served a different purpose, (i.e. preventing destitution, 
and similarly extreme circumstances), does not remotely imply that the concept NEED is being 
mistreated in its application in modern alimony law. It is usually not a matter of potential destitution 
for the ex-spouse, but rather a maintenance of the standard of living enjoyed within the marriage; 
which is actually admitted by Bix to be the intended referent of NEED in modern alimony law. Not 
being made destituteLWLVIDLUWRDVVXPHZRXOGFHUWDLQO\ILWXQGHU%L[¶VFRQFHSWLRQRIµEDVLFPLQLPDO
requiUHPHQWVRIOLIH¶DQG thus be a more appropriate legal application of NEED under his account. Bix 
continues: 
(T)he awkward compromise that was reached was that when a divorce occurred, though the 
PDUULDJHZDVGLVVROYHGWKHKXVEDQG¶VREOLJDWLRQWR support his wife would continue, and this 
would be through periodic payments FDOOHGµDOLPRQ\¶«7ime passed, and alimony, this 
residue of a historical period, continued, even if only granted in a small fraction of divorces. 
However, a new justification was sought. Many courts began to speak of alimony being 
appropriate where, and to the extent that, the recipient spouse (almost always the wife) could 
SURYHµQHHG¶7KLVLVWKHterminology and rhetoric that one finds in a large proportion of 
alimony cases to this very day.59 
Even if the legal test for granting alimony was historically a requirement to meet basic minimal 
requirements of life (in this case, destitution), there is no reason for this particular invocation of NEED 
to make the use of NEED inappropriate in alimony law today; for it is conceded by Bix that the 
referent of NEED in this context is to maintain the same quality of life that the ex-spouse enjoyed 
within the marriage. If this is the accepted extension of NEED in that particular context then it is 
difficult to see how there is a problem in its use. Most concepts are required to be stretchy to work, 
are necessarily vague,60 to fit around various contexts so they are useful.61 
6RPHUHYHODWLRQLQWR%L[¶VFULWLTXHWKDWNEED is stretched to cover modern alimony law is 
encountered further in: 
Also, law, at least the common law system the United States inherited from 
England, is a process of reasoning and law-making that has strong ties to the past. 
The new case has to fit into the categories and concepts that we created for a prior 
case²fitting cases that came up hundreds of years before, in a different society, with 
different technology, facing a different set of problems. So judges often end up 
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 I return to issues of vagueness in part II of this chapter and chapter four part I. 
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 %L[¶VWUHDWPHQWRIFREEDOM in contract law is another good example of this, which I consider in part II of this 
chapter. 
- 20 - 
 
stretching the meaning of concepts, or using legal fictions to bridge the old rule 
with the new equities.62 
NEED is capable of wide applications to a huge variety of referents in extension. Just because 
American alimony law once used NEED in a particular way hardly taints the use of the concept in 
modern applications, provided the use of the concept is actually sensible. We can utilise intension and 
extension to assess this and see that NEED LVQRWEHLQJµVWUHWFKHG¶LWLVVLPSO\EHLQJXVHGLQDFHUWDLQ
ZD\LQUHODWLRQWRDFHUWDLQUHIHUHQWLQH[WHQVLRQ7KHLGHDRIKDYLQJWRµEULGJH¶NEED outside of some 
very specific, and irrelevant, DSSOLFDWLRQLQRUGHUIRULWQRWWRµVWUHWFKWKHPHDQLQJ¶LVDEL]DUUHRQHWR
say the least. Bix¶VFRQWHQWLRQ strongly implies that NEED has certain associations,63 and these make it 
an unsuitable legal use of the word, and this appears to be the root of his criticismµ,QWLPHZHKDYH
learned the power of mere labels. Perhaps the sensitivity to names and the power they can have, is 
greatest in family law¶.64 
He goes on to say that NEED has an association RIµFKDULW\¶: 
Perhaps if we followed the ALI, and started speaking of alimony in terms of what a spouse 
KDVµHDUQHG¶UDWKHUWKDQFKDULW\JLYHQWRPHHWVSRXVDOµQHHGV¶WKHUHZRXOG also be less 
pressure to reduce the frequency, length and amounts given in those awards.65 
This is a conceptual mess that needs careful disambiguation. No doubt a conception of charity in this 
use of NEED leaks through from the original assumption about NEED: that it conventionally means the 
satisfaction of basic minimal requirements of life. For if we are talking about a potential failure to 
meet basic requirements of life, charity may indeed spring to mind in relation to this referent NEED 
might sometimes have. But it does not have it here; Bix relates the use of NEED to charitable 
associations, yet the particular extension of NEED within the context of alimony law is to maintain 
µVRPHWKLQJOLNHWKHTXDOLW\RIOLIHVKHRUKHHQMR\HGGXULQJWKHPDUULDJH¶.66 While it may very well be 
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wrong to enforce this standard, it is far from any reasonable association of charity that supposedly 
makes it an unfit word to use in alimony law.67  
It is partly in this way that the usefulness of carefully marking the division of intension and extension 
can be seen. One may have a vague idea of what they associate with a certain concept68 (essentially, 
what associations or connotations it does/ought to have), but it feels blurry and difficult to pin down 
in a way that cannot be articulated clearly. If one was recently mugged on a holiday in France, any 
subjective positive or negative associations that come with that is not something that is likely being 
communicated with intent by the speaker, yet this is a part of how the concept is understood by the 
recipient. Alternatively, some concepts have associations which are generally shared and integral to 
their meaning in a more objective way,69 when compared to being mugged in France. To be bold, for 
example, has a clear positive association to it that is shared by most competent speakers of English. 
However if one was bold in seeking something that was not their due, for instance boldly stealing, the 
associations would be more mixed and negative than another example, i.e. being bold in declaring 
your love for the object of your desires. These examples clearly demonstrate how approaching the 
relevant association from the particular extension in question helps bring clarity to our thoughts when 
we are being influenced by strong associations one way or the other.   
This can be further explored by adding more information to the context of the examples: if, in the first 
instance, the thief was stealing food to feed hungry children who had no means of feeding themselves, 
the associations turn positive,70 and this is purely from knowing more about the extension of BOLD in 
this context. Additionally, if the second example involved the romantic doing so while he was also 
involved with the object-of-his-desires sister, and kept this secret, the associations would (for many) 
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 There is a reasonable amount of research into this aspect of communication in linguistic studies: Geoffrey 
Leech, Semantics: The Study of Meaning (Penguin Books 1990); Nigel Love, µTranslational Semantics¶ (1983) 
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Anthony Skelton, 'Henry Sidgwick's Practical Ethics: A Defense' (2006) 18 Utilitas 199. Deontological 
perspectives may potentially suggest otherwise, see John Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights (2nd edn OUP 
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turn negative. These two alternating examples demonstrate the significance of the referent in 
extension ZKHQEHDULQJLQPLQGRXUµHPRWLYHUHVSRQVH¶71 to associations we may hold toward certain 
concepts. Attention to intension and extension when considering our own attitudes toward something 
can bring clarity of thought within discussions that would otherwise bring out and validate emotive 
responses for the wrong reasons. It is possible that a concept is so regularly used in a context that has 
negative associations, that the concept is permanently attached to the negativity; or vice versa with 
positive associations. Consider the following: 
There are words ± or rather concepts ± that do not simply describe a fragment of possible 
UHDOLW\³7HUURULVW´LVQRWVLPSO\XVHGWRUHIHUWRDSHUVRQZKRFRPPLWVVSHFLILFDFWLRQVZLWKD 
VSHFLILFLQWHQW:RUGVVXFKDV³WRUWXUH´RU³PDVVDFUH´³IUHHGRP´RU³SHDFH´FDUU\ZLWKWKHP
something more than a simple description of a state of affairs, a mere conceptual content. 
7KHVHZRUGVDUH³HWKLFDO´WKH\KDYHD³PDJQHWLF´HIIHFWDQLPSHUDWLYH force, a tendency to 
LQIOXHQFHWKHLQWHUORFXWRU¶VGHFLVLRQV.72 
Some of these concepts are this way precisely for their lack of variance in application. TORTURE and 
MASSACRE can hardly be understood in other contexts in the positive way BOLD could be above, 
(except perhaps uncommon fringe examples such as two businessmen or sportsmen talking about how 
WKH\µPDVVDFUHG¶WKHFRPSHWLWLRQ). I return to FREEDOM in some detail in part II of this chapter. For 
now, I simply illustrate how the context in which we are used to using a word can massively vary, and 
if we contrast NEED with TORTURE, it is immediately apparent that NEED has a sufficiently varied 
DUUD\RIUHIHUHQWVLQH[WHQVLRQWREHVHQVLEO\DSSOLFDEOHWRZKDW,UHIHUWRDVDµOHVVLPSRUWDQW¶UHIHUHQW, 
withoXWEHLQJµVWUHWFKHG¶LQDQ\ZD\  
Simply because NEED is capable of referring to a circumstance where we may associate negative 
meaning of the type Bix puts forward, does not mean where it does not its use is somehow tainted. 
Bix attaches qualities to NEED because of a different proposition of which NEED is predicated: meeting 
minimal requirements of life. He then attaches these to NEED itself, or more technically, the intension 
of NEED. As Pethick criticises in relation to coherence theories that fall into the same error: 
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The oversight has caused qualities to be ascribed routinely to coherence that properly attach 
to various object(s) of which coherence is predicated, and which a theorist happens to have in 
mind when bringing coherence into view.73 
Substitute COHERENCE for NEED LQWKLVTXRWHDQGWKLVSUREOHPZLWK%L[¶VSRVLWLRQLVH[SODLQHGLQ
terms that were intended for solving an entirely separate philosophical problem, a problem that wound 
itself up through inattention to intension and extension (I say a lot more about this in part II of chapter 
two). Ultimately, while his claim contains a few different ideas, it can succinctly be found in the 
following: µ(W)HQRORQJHUKDYHWRVWUHWFKWKHZRUGµQHHG¶WRFRYHUPLGGOHFODVVDQGXSSHUFODVV
standard-of-living payments¶.74 There has still been no substantial reason given why NEED¶s 
application VKRXOGH[FOXGHµPLGGOHFODVVRUXSSHUFODVVVWDQGDUG-of-OLYLQJSD\PHQWV¶7KHSRWHQWLDO 
various extensions of NEED reach more than this narrow description, yet this is not something Bix 
considers in the article; NEED LVQRWµVWUHWFKHG¶WRFRYHUPRUHWKDQµEDVLFPLQLPDOUHTXLUHPHQWVRI
OLIH¶.  
A further confusion Bix encounters results from not distinguishing between why ex-spouses should 
have the rights they do in alimony law (a separate question) and any misapplication of NEED: 
:KHQWKHFRXUWVVSHDNRIVSRXVDOµQHHG¶LQDOLPRQ\FDVHWKHUHIHUHQFHLVRIWHQ 
indirectly, to the standard of living within the marriage. A long-term spouse is held 
basically to have a right to something like the quality of life she or he enjoyed during the 
marriage, and may receive alimony if his or her income-earning capacity will not rise near 
that level after the marriage is over. However, again, courts rarely venture to articulate why 
spouses in long term-marriages should be thought of to have such rights.75  
While making his argument that NEED is not being used in a conventional way, Bix, in the above 
quotation, suggests that the justification for alimony itself is unsatisfactory and requires further 
thought. The argument made that the justification for alimony law requires scrutiny is not the same as 
his argument that the language used within alimony law is unsuitable; they are mixed together to the 
extent they appear to become entangled. While interesting and worthwhile, questioning the 
justifications for alimony law76 has no relevance to the question of whether NEED is being misapplied 
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or misused in alimony law. Bix, though, attaches the two in a curious way that it is important to 
distinguish; the justification for alimony law is an independent question. 8QIRUWXQDWHO\LQµLaw and 
/DQJXDJH+RZ:RUGV0LVOHDG8V¶ no cases are offered as examples with judges making spurious 
points regarding NEED to demonstrate the apparent misuse, which would go a long way to elucidating 
his point.  
Bix has an interesting alternative suggestion that further demonstrates the problem with his position: 
At least one American state, the State of Texas, does not allow permanent alimony (except 
where the recipient or a dependant child is mentally or physically disabled), and places strict 
time and dollar constraints on what the courts can award even on a temporary basis. Also, 
many states, by legislation or court practice, have moved from preferring permanent (that is, 
indefinite) alimony to preferring temporary (oUµUHKDELOLWDWLYH¶DOLPRQ\:Hunderstand the 
WHUPµUHKDELOLWDWH¶LQWKHFRQWH[W of alimony²give the spouse the time and resources needed 
to retrain and re-enter the workforce²better than we understand the word µQHHG¶77 
In this passage Bix seemingly tries to compare REHABILITATIVE and NEED in a way that is supposed 
to demonstrate 1(('¶V shortcomings for use in American alimony law. But they are not related in the 
way the quotation seems to suggest. It is difficult to comment on what Bix might have meant by the 
SURSRVLWLRQµ:HXQGHUVWDQGWKHWHUPµUHKDELOLWDWH¶LQWKHFRQWH[WRIDOLPRQ\«better than we 
understand the word need¶ because it is the only sentence on the matter. Quite clearly, at least part of 
his complaint is with the substance of AAL; the length of and justifications for payments. Attempting 
his assault through the conceptual analysis of NEED only serves to conflate these two separate 
questions. He disputes the use of NEED in this context because it has negative associations  that would 
best be avoided, yet REHABILITATIVE has the exact same problem to the same degree if not greater. 
REHABILITATIVE isE\H[WHQVLRQRI%L[¶VDUJXPHQW beset by all kinds of negative associations that 
one might dispute in the same way that Bix does with NEED. When analysed in the way that Bix does 
for NEED, REHABILITATIVE has its own negative associations that anyone might dispute as an 
unsuitable way to describe alimony law. A seemingly silly example, but one that demonstrate the 
problem well, is associations of drug use that some may find negative. Just because rehabilitation is 
sometimes used in this way does not mean that it is being µstretched¶ to describe temporary alimony. 
We can realise that REHABILITATIVE may carry these associations, for some people in some 
circumstances, yet WKHH[WHQVLRQRIUHKDELOLWDWLYHDOLPRQ\LQ%L[¶VLQVWDQFHLVOHDSVDQGERXQGVDZD\
from any such conception. There is of course little we can do, or even should do, if these associations 
come to mind when the application in question being different to our preferred instantiation of a 
concept. Suggesting a court act on them and reject the concept, like Bix does for NEED, is not 
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warranted. There is no stronger method of settling these conceptual disputes than appealing to 
intension and extension. Although the associations of drug use with REHABILITATIVE is a *seemingly* 
rather ludicrous comparison between the different contexts in which rehabilitation can be used, it is 
functionally identical to Bix taking issue with the use of NEED in the context of family law because in 
some circumstances one might describe NEED DVPHDQLQJWKHVDWLVIDFWLRQRIµPLQLPDOUHTXLUHPHQWVRI
OLIH¶6RPHWLPHVNEED is used in that way, and when it is it certainly might bring up an emotive78 
response, but there is no reason to criticise the use of the word in alimony law because of this separate 
and distinct use of the concept. 
Bix is right that associations have significance and courts should be aware of the impact their choices 
may have. Though without examining the referent in extension we are unable to precisely place a 
concept into context, and consequently any analysis will revolve around just how we happen to feel 
about it, and what associations we feel are appropriate based on not very much. Rehabilitative 
DOLPRQ\WRXVH%L[¶VH[DPSOHLVDILQHZD\WRGHVFULEHWKHWHPSRUDU\DOLPRQ\WRZKLFKKHLV
UHIHUULQJIRULWZHOOFRPPXQLFDWHVWKHQDWXUHRIWKHDOLPRQ\EHLQJSURYLGHGµJive the spouse the 
time and resources needed to retrain and re-HQWHUWKHZRUNIRUFH¶.79 Yet, describing the ex-spouse as 
needing to maintain the same standard of living as that they enjoyed within the marriage is just as 
valid. (And is actually, on the face of it, a different assessment. Here again Bix crosses the lines 
between 1(('¶6apparent misuse and justifications for current alimony law). There is little reason 
provided by Bix to take his SRLQWWKDWZHXQGHUVWDQGWKLVXVHRIUHKDELOLWDWLYHDOLPRQ\µEHWWer than we 
XQGHUVWDQGWKHZRUGµQHHG¶¶80. His preference for REHABILITATIVE over NEED is subject to the same 
erroneous criticisms he makes of NEED.  
Part II- Degrees of Freedom and Vagueness 
There is a connecting thread between the concepts analysed by Bix: the effect that associations we 
make towards certain legal concepts can have on communication. Since so many concepts are briefly 
handled in the article it is not surprising that the mistakes occur with other concepts as well, 
parWLFXODUO\µIUHHGRPRIFRQWUDFW¶  
 ,WLVOLNHWKHTXHVWLRQRIZKHWKHUWKHUHZDVPHDQLQJIXOµIUHHGRPRIFRQWUDFW¶ 
for the bakers and other workers in Lochner v New York and the related United 
States Supreme Court cases in the early decades of the 20th century. In those cases, 
constitutional challenges were brought against state legislation purporting to protect 
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workers by setting maximum employment hours, minimum hourly wages, and 
workplace health and safety standards. Those challenging such statutes claimed that 
the laws unconstitutioQDOO\LQIULQJHGWKHZRUNHUV¶µIUHHGRPRIFRQWUDFW¶WKHLU 
freedom to enter agreements to work particularly long hours, for particularly low 
wages, and in doubtful working conditions. 
Rhetorical excess aside, I really do mean to say that it is an interesting question 
ZKHWKHUµIUHHGRPRIFRQWUDFW¶LVSUHVHQWLQDPRUDOO\VLJQLILFDQWVHQVHHLWKHUIRUWKH 
users of software in so-FDOOHGµFOLFNZDUH¶DQGµEURZVHZDUH¶WUDQVDFWLRQVDQGRWKHU 
forms of electronic contracting, or for the workers who were the subject of 
paternalistic legislation. One can understand the argument that bakers can 
sometimes reasonably and autonomously choose to work longer hours, even at a 
low rate and in poor conditions (they may need the extra pay that long hours bring, 
and the alternative to a low-paying job in bad conditions may be no job at all), 
«<RXFDQFDOOLWµFRQVHQW¶\RXFDQFDOOLWµIUHHGRPRIFRQWUDFW¶EXWPRVWRIWKH 
time, I just think it is the 13th floor.81 
Essentially, Bix suggests it is problematic in some way to talk aboXWµIUHHGRPRIFRQWUDFW¶LQDFRQWH[W
that imposes limitation on that freedom. Lochner v New York82 is referenced in illustration of the 
claim that maximum working hours and minimum wage interfere with freedom to contract. Bix says 
ZHDUHµDOORZLQJRXUVHOYHVWREHIRROHG¶83, DQGWKDWLWLVµMXVWWKHth IORRU¶84, if we consider this to be 
freedom to contract.85 7KHDWWLWXGH%L[WDNHVWRZDUGVWKHµSRZHURIPHUHODEHOV¶LVPDGH even more 
evident through this example from µHow Words Mislead Us¶. Bix offers an example of some 
restrictions on FREEDOM, and claims that consequently when FREEDOM is attached to these we are µDUH
DOORZLQJRXUVHOYHVWREHIRROHG¶%XWLWLVQRWRQO\VHQVLEOHRUULJKWWRXVHIUHHGRPDVDFRQFHSWZKHQ
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there are no restrictions involved.86 Indeed, one could hardly imagine a circumstance where this 
would be the case; FREEDOM does not sit in a void where it is only applicable where it absolutely is 
the case. There is a spectrum upon which different instances of the use of freedom are more or less 
free; the concept FREEDOM is capable of conveying varying degrees87 and it is sensible, and we are 
QRWµIRROLQJRXUVHOYHV¶WRVD\VRPHWKLQJPD\EHPRUHRU less free.88 Susan Haack, whose ideas around 
TRUTH I return to in chapter two part II, puts forward that TRUTH is not susceptible to varying degrees, 
(is not a fuzzy predicate)89, as something is either true or not:  
=DGHK¶VFODLPWKDWµWUXH¶DQGµIDOVH¶DUHIX]]\SUHGLFDWHVLVVXSSRUWHGLQSDUWE\DQDSSHDOWR
linguistic evidence: that certain adverbial PRGLILHUVZKLFKDSSO\WRIX]]\SUHGLFDWHVOLNHµWDOO¶
DQGZKLFKLQGLFDWHWKHGHJUHHWRZKLFKWKHSUHGLFDWHDSSOLHVHJµYHU\¶«DOVRDSSO\WR
µWUXH¶DQGµIDOVH¶,VKDOODUJXHWKDW=DGHKLVZURQJDERXWWKLV90 
The question of whether degrees are conveyed by a particular concept is informed by the huge 
philosophical literature surrounding vagueness in language and law, making the mistake one that one 
might reasonably raise an eyebrow at. )5(('20¶Vrole as a fuzzy predicate, in this way, accounts for 
the variance in its application. It¶V quite possible that Bix did not neglect this relevant philosophy, and 
simply considers maximum working hours and minimum wage to be so invasive on the freedom of 
contracting bakers that it is wrong to describe them as having µIUHHGRPWRFRQWUDFW¶ as a matter of 
degrees. That is, these restrictions upon them are sufficiently far on the spectrum91 of less free (rather 
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detail on the philosophy on this point as my claim here is quite uncontroversial. I do, however, return to the 
issue of vagueness in chapter four.  
89
 Concepts such as TALL, JUSTICE and FREEDOM are clearly capable of expressing varying degrees of 
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 There have even been attempts to explore exactly how a concept may be applied in this way if possible, (such 
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than more free). His position implies that this is the case, yet the obvious problem with his analysis 
lies undefended: that it is sensible, (and, crucially, people do), use FREEDOM in attachment to referents 
that come with restrictions upon that freedom.  
 
Furthermore, %L[¶V errors here fall out under his general mistake of not fully appreciating the 
difference of DFRQFHSWDQGWKHFRQFHSW¶VDSSOLFDWLRQWRDYDULHW\RIUHIHUHQWVThe issues of vagueness 
explored above are informed by separating FREEDOM and its various referents in application in the 
VDPHZD\DV%L[¶VWUHDWPHQWRINEED; his mistake falls into the exact framework used to address his 
misconceptions surrounding NEED. 92 Though he offers no particular example of what might constitute 
an appropriate use of FREEDOM, (as he does with NEED), Bix has a preferred (perhaps idealised) 
invocation of FREEDOM and consequently attempts to restrict its proper use to this preferred instance. 
The criticisms he makes RIµIUHHGRPRIFRQWUDFW¶ likely flow from this initial misconception; he offers 
no immediately obvious preference in which FREEDOM most suitably applies, though speaks as if 
µIUHHGRPRIFRQWUDFW¶ZRXOGEHSUHVHQWZLWKµWZRVRSKLVWLFDWHGSDUWLHVQHJRWLDWLQJRXWHDFKVLJQLILFDQW
term of an DJUHHPHQW¶7KLVLVWRbe contrasted with the following example he considers, (which are 
increasingly more invasive on freedom to contract in comparison to the bakers example), include 
online contracts,93 technical contracts which normal consumers have no knowledge of and terms and 
conditions upon purchase being sent in the box it was sent in, to voting in a fascist state where there is 
only one party to choose from.94 These all sit on varying points on the scale of how free contract is 
understood in these contexts.95 Some of them may infringe the freedom of contract to such an extent 
we would not want to describe it as freedom to contract at all (i.e. maybe in overly-technical contracts 
or certainly in one-party state elections). Yet Bix suggests that almost any level of infringement upon 
freedom means that it would be deceptive to describe it as such, perhaps because of the associations it 
carries, beneficial or not, and/or simply because it is descriptively inaccurate. Both these positions are 
deeply misguided. When we analyse whether we want to or should describe someone or something as 
                                                                                                                                                              
Vagueness: an exercise in logical analysis (1937) 4 Philosophy of Science 427. See the Black-Hempel debate, 
Williamson Vagueness (Taylor & Francis 2002) 73 
92
 To reiterate for clarity: 1) a preferred, particular invocation of a concept, is identified, that is considered to be 
especially important. 2) The features of this preferred invocation are brought to mind. 3) These features are 
transferred onto the concept itself, as opposed to the particular referent that initially evoked those features. 4) 
The originally flexible and well understood concept is tainted in applications that are not consistent with the 
features of one, (seemingly random and personal), referent that concept might occasionally have. We shall go on 
to see how the framework is applicable, and of aid generally, in solving perceived philosophical problems in a 






 Which is perfectly well explained by basic attention to the necessarily vague application of concepts. 
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being free or having freedom, we are examining the referent of FREEDOM; be it variations of baker¶s 
contracts, one-party states RUµtwo sophisticated parties negotiating out each significant term of an 
DJUHHPHQW¶.  
,WLVDOVRQRWFOHDUZK\WKHVXSSRVHGDVVRFLDWLRQVWKDWFDXVHµIUHHGRPRIFRQWUDFW¶Gifficulty are not to 
be associated with CONTRACT instead. It is certainly not a given that they pertain to FREEDOM alone, 
but this is a symptom of a wider problem; that the influence RIµWKHSRZHURIPHUHODEHOV¶ is 
considerably subjective.96 Lifting a relevant quote from a case I consider in chapter three: 
Needs do not exist in a vacuum: there must be a need for something.97  
This judicial remark relates indirectly to what I refer to as the intension and extension of NEED, which 
does QRWµH[LVWLQDYDFXXP¶ a real world point of reference is required; an extension for the intension 
to link with. This is the base problem, from which all others flow, within %L[¶VDQDO\VLV FREEDOM 
and NEED have almost limitless available extensions, but until attached to one specifically in a 
particular context it can not be analysed in the way that Bix puts forward. Paying heed to this 
GLVWLQFWLRQKDVDOORZHGPHWRFOHDUXSWKHUDWKHUFRQIXVLQJPHVVWKDWµLaw and Language: How 
Words Mislead Us¶ leaves of NEED and FREEDOM. Timothy Endicott developed theory around the 
necessarily vague nature of language in a legal context,98 and it is natural that some instances of a 
concept sit on the edge99 of whether we ought to apply them descriptively or not. It is not a working 
solution to view concepts abstractly, affixing importance to preferred invocations, and finding their 
use distasteful or wrong if they are used when they do not cohere with these invocations. As with 
%L[¶VWUHDWPHQWRINEED then, his treatment of freedom is illuminated by utilising intension and 
extension to inform foggy issues that would otherwise be impossible to articulate exactly and dissect 
with sufficient clarity. 
This first chapter has served a core purpose in the development of my wider argumentative arc. The 
deWDLOHGLQVSHFWLRQRI%L[¶VHUURUVSODFHVP\evaluations into the frame of contemporary conceptual 
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 This is not always the case, i.e. where negative or positive connotations are almost universally shared, but 
these instances still rely on what the extension of the relevant concept is as many exceptions exist (n 69).  
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 R v Gloucestershire CC and Another, Ex parte Barry [1997] 2 WLR 459 (HL) 590  
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 (QGLFRWWµ9DJXHQHVVLQ/DZ¶(n 88) 
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 :LWWJHQVWHLQ¶VQRWLRQRIµIDPLO\UHVHPEODQFH¶ZHOODUWLFOHVWKLVFDSDELOLW\RIFRQFHSWVWRVLWRQWKe edge of 
their application; Philosophical Investigations: µ$QGWKHUHVXOWRIWKLVH[DPLQDWLRQLVZHVHHDFRPSOLFDWHG
network of similarities overlapping and criss-crossing: sometimes overall similarities, sometimes similarities of 
detail. I can think of no better expression to characterize these similarities than "family resemblances"; for the 
various resemblances between members of a family: build, features, colour of eyes, gait, temperament, etc. etc. 
overlap and criss-cross in the same way.² And I shall VD\
JDPHV
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analysis. Without this step, our understanding would be incomplete; the similar errors encountered 
further in might appear to stand in isolation, mere blips in an otherwise well understood landscape. 
This is far from the case. We start here at the top of the pyramid, and as we descend, casting off the 
misconceptions promoted in the highest level of jurisprudence, it becomes apparent they are not 
contained here alone, but manifest themselves within the application of legal principles themselves. 
The specific instances of the errors in question are entirely solvable, and this can not be fully achieved 
without attention to some of the general considerations prompted by such a solution. This, along with 
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Chapter Two- A Stronger Understanding and a Better Alternative 
Introduction 
This chapter will develop a wider account of the relevant philosophical ideas and issues I have begun 
to delineate, and of those to come. I will, for the sake of necessary succinctness, be highly selective in 
what is included and the following will be split into three parts. Part I identifies and examines the 
purpose of conceptual analysis within the remit of this thesis and explores the basis on which one 
account may be preferable to another. Also dealt with is how the notion of talking past one another is 
relevant to my criticisms of Bix in chapter one, and generally of others I go on to discuss. Part II 
provides evidence and commentary of how the misconceptions I highlight are committed elsewhere, 
in other philosophical and legal contexts, drawing on work conducted other theorists. Part III sets 
aside concerns that my thesis is beholden to questions pertaining to the esoteric meaning of a concept, 
as opposed to a disregard of the relation between a concept and thaWFRQFHSW¶VSRVVLEOHUHIHUHQWV. This 
is necessary in side-stepping irrelevant issues that might otherwise be perceived to bear on my 
analysis, and is helpful in distinguishing the role intension and extension have within modern 
conceptual analysis. Finally, the relation that intension and extension hold with other important 
philosophical distinctions is inspected.   
Part I- On the Defence: Conceptual Claims, Why and How? 
I speculatively suggest, though by no means attempts to demonstrate conclusively, (for this would 
involve an investigation far larger), that if a disregard for intension and extension is made at some of 
the highest levels of philosophical analysis, it is at least conceivable, if not probable, that the same 
mistake occurs elsewhere. I present instances where heed ought to have been paid to intension and 
extension, but this is often in contexts where analysis of language is not the primary aim in mind (i.e. 
in a court case where language is a means to an end, rather than within philosophical discourse where 
it is an end in itself).100 It is significant that the basic philosophical errors of which I speak occur in 
philosophical analysis where the aim of that analysis is at least partly for its own sake. One can 
imagine conceptual mistakes being made in other contexts, by those who have not studied conceptual 
analysis in any particular depth, but what we have seen in the previous chapter is the same mistakes 




DQDO\VLVµ$OWKRXJK,E\QRPHDQVZDQWWRencourage a dismissive or cynical approach to legal theory, I do 
believe that the sceptical question-³ZKDWLVWKHSRLQW´DQGWKHOLNH- should always be kept in mind, and that it is 
only by keeping such questions in mind that the issues (and the theorists) can be understood clearly and in 
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being made in the pursuit of conceptual analysis itself. This is little comfort, however, when these 
misconceptions cause problems in courts. 
In µ&RQFHSWXDO4XHVWLRQVDQG-XULVSUXGHQFH¶,101 also written by Bix, some relevant and intriguing 
remarks are made on the role of conceptual analysis in jurisprudence. He DWWHPSWVµto elaborate upon 
some of the differing reasons for conceptual analysis and what consequences may follow from 
choosing one objective rather than another¶.102 These reasons are made particularly relevant 
considering the focus of chapter oneµConceptual Questions and Jurisprudence¶ asks what the point 
of conceptual analysis is. This is a question worth considering in a little detail here, considering the 
nature of this thesis. He rightly asks:  
Although I by no means want to encourage a dismissive or cynical approach to legal theory, I 
do believe that the sceptical questions-³ZKDWLVWKHSRLQW"´DQGWKHOLNH- should always be 
kept in mind, and it is only by keeping such questions in mind that the issues (and the 
theorists) can be understood clearly and in depth.103 
This is agreeable.  And that:  
The merit of a conceptual claim can only be evaluated once it is clear what the purpose of the 
claim is. The thesis I am defending in this article is that (descriptively or historically 
speaking) different conceptual claims have different purposes.104  
µHow Words Mislead Us¶ KDVWKHIROORZLQJµSXUSRVH¶µH[SORUHVRPHRIWKHZD\VLQZKich we have 
EHHQOHGDVWUD\SDUWLFXODUO\LQFRQWUDFWODZDQGIDPLO\ODZE\RXUOHJDOODQJXDJH¶105 I contend in the 
previous chapter that the conceptual claims made regarding NEED are false (in the sense an oversight 
is committed), despite the claim in µConceptual Questions and Jurisprudence¶ WKDWµ$FRQFHSWXDO
claim, as opposed to a claim that is meant to be predictive or explanatory, is not testable or falsifiable, 
DWOHDVWQRWLQDQ\REYLRXVZD\¶106 The important caveat here being µQRWLQDQ\REYLRXVZD\¶; Bix 
goes on to consider in what ways this may be the case. In my rebuttal of his criticism of NEED in 
alimony law I would associate my critique with what he professes a little further on:  
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 %ULDQ%L[µ&RQFHSWXDO4XHVWLRQVDQG-XULVSUXGHQFH¶ Legal Theory (1995) 1 465 
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One possible basis for claiming that one conceptual theory was superior to another would be 
that the definition proffered better reflects the way we actually use the term.107 
7KLVLVTXLWHFUXFLDOIRUWKLVLVWDNHQIURP%L[¶VRZQZRUNDQGLVDQDJUHHDEOHUHDVRQIRUSUHIHUULQJ
one µconceptual theory¶108  over another. It is on this basis that I claim my treatment of NEED is 
VXSHULRUWR%L[¶VLQWKHFRQWH[WRI$PHULFDQDOLPRQ\ODZ; my conceptual WKHRU\µEHWWHUUHIOHFWVWKH
ZD\ZHDFWXDOO\XVHWKHWHUP¶%L[¶Vconception of NEED in Law and Language is overly restrictive, 
and inaccurate when applied to how a concept is actually used, as chapter one explored.   
Moreover, Bix concludes that:  
(O)ne might not be able to say that a particular conceptual analysis was right or true (at least 
not in the sense that there would be only one unique right or true theory for all conceptual 
questions), but I do not see this as a significant loss. It should be sufficient that one can affirm 
(or deny) that an analysis is good (or better than an alternative) for a particular purpose.109 
This is a tURXEOLQJFRQFOXVLRQLQVRPHUHJDUGVDVLWPD\JLYHOHHZD\IRUWKHFODLPWKDW%L[¶V
treatment of NEED in alimony law is good for the purpose he sets out to achieve: to identify how 
language can detrimentally mislead in a legal context.110 Though, as I show in a moment, our 
purposes directly confront each other. An interesting side note is that the above extract potentially 
breeds an uncomfortable type of relativism with regard to conceptual claims. I would maintain that 
my analysis of NEED¶Vuse is correct universally, not only for a particular purpose; (though this is not 
QHFHVVDU\WRFKDOOHQJH%L[¶VFODLPVLQFHRXUDLPVFRLQFLGHZLWKRQHDQRWKHULWLVVXIILFLHQWO\UHOHYDQW
to remark upon). This is because my analysis accounts for the generality and flexibility, (or 
VWUHWFKLQHVVWRXVH%L[¶V intended criticism in a positive manner), of concepts, and all instances in 
which they may be deployed. This claim to universality is consistent with how Bix111 describes that a 
µdefinition« better reflects the way we actually use the term¶,112 since consideration of intension and 
extension is a method of directly assessing the context of a particular invocation.  
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 Accordingly this is not to raise issues surrounding relativism or the existence, (or lack thereof), of various 
kinds of objective truth of the type as explored by, for instance, Finnis in µ1DWXUDO/DZDQG1DWXUDO5LJKWV¶DQG
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Accordingly, under this structure, %L[DQG,DUHQRWµWDONLQJSDVWHDFKRWKHU¶DVcan often be the 
problem in conceptual analysis.113 This is worth some consideration as it is not always apparent if this 
is the case, and I am keen to dispel any idea that we may be; especially considering the comments 
FRQVLGHUHGDERYHIURP%L[¶VDUWLFOHDERXWWKHSXUSRVHREMHFWLYH of conceptual analysis being a 
means of measuring its success. µConcepts, Terms and Fields of Enquiry¶, by Andrew Halpin, 
responds to Bix. In this, Halpin measures how we can identify whether ZHVKDUHDµILHOGRIHQTXLU\¶114 
in competing analyses. NaturallyP\FRQVLGHUDWLRQRIERWK+DOSLQ¶Varticle and %L[¶VµConceptual 
Questions and Jurisprudence¶ will be limited to the points that are relevant to this thesis, for much of 
what they consider falls outside its remit. Yet there are some key issues of direct relevance. On the 
face of it, iWVHHPVFOHDUWKDW%L[DQG,DUHQRWWDONLQJSDVWHDFKRWKHURUDWWHQGLQJWRGLIIHUHQWµILHOGV
RIHQTXLU\¶ZKHQLQYHVWLJDWLQJDOLPRQ\ODZ, partially because we use the same concept in the same 
context. However as Halpin says: 
We start as we must do, with a field of enquiry. The failure to identify our field of enquiry 
means that we cannot be sure of engaging in meaningful discussion with others, as there is 
always a danger that we are investigating different fields of enquiry. Even though the field of 
enquiry may be identified by a particular term, we cannot simply assume that identifying the 
field of enquiry with a term guarantees a common field of enquiry with those whose field is 
identified by the same term.115  
Operating within different fields of enquiry is very closely connected to the idea of talking past one 
another in conceptual analysis.116 The above quote illustrates why simply using the same term will not 
ensure commentators are not attending to different fields of enquiry or talking past one another. Bix 
and I avoid talking past one another not only because we use the same concept, but also because of 
the context in which we use it; with the shared aim of inspecting the language used by the courts in 
alimony law and assesVLQJZKHWKHUWKH\VKRXOGGRVRRUQRW2QHPLJKWFKXUOLVKO\VXJJHVWWKDW%L[¶V
aim is more specific than this, (investigating areas where language misleads us), and his analysis has 
merit under his objective and my analysis has merit under mine; but there is not scope for each 
competing analysis to both be correct, due to them having directly competing aims. It is worth noting 
that the notion of talking past one another is usually used in a way that applies to concepts such as 
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law,117 democracy118 and art.119 However, the same difficulties are quite capable of applying to NEED, 
making such consideration necessary in defence of my claims in this thesis. The primary significance 
RI+DOSLQ¶VDVVHVVPHQWIRUP\SXUSRVHVLV contained in the following: 
This general point applies across the three principal purposes in Bix's classification. Bix 
himself points out the "unresolvable disagreement" that occurs when two theorists are 
apparently debating the nature of law but have separately identified law with a different 
feature that the term is capable of conveying. This will apply equally where a different 
understanding of linguistic usage is taken, or where different criteria for an evaluative 
test are associated with the term. In his own introduction to legal theory, Bix is forced to limit 
the term "law" to "municipal, institutional law.´120 
Bix certainly has a different understanding of the linguistic usage of NEED to a degree.  Yet this 
understanding of the linguistic issue is where our disagreement lies. %L[KDVDµGLIIHrent understanding 
RIOLQJXLVWLFXVDJH¶UHJDUGLQJNEED, and in this small way one may entertain the conclusion that 
actually we are talking past one another, as his understanding of 1(('¶V use is different to mine, and 
accordingly this may raise the question how we can sensibly discuss NEED in any meaningful way. 
Such a contention is baseless; my very criticism is, broadly, WKDW%L[¶VXQGHUVWDQGLQJRIKRZNEED is 
                                                   
117
 ,Hµ%L[LVIRUFHGWROLPLWWKHFRQFHSW³ODZWR³PXQLFLSDOLQVWLWXWLRQDOODZ´¶Ibid 190. If I am talking about 
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this basic example we are talking past each other. 
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WKHLU
appraisive character, (II) internal complexity, (III) diverse describability, (IV) openness, (V) reciprocal 
recognition of their contested character among contending parties, (VI) an original exemplar that anchors 
conceptual meaning, and (VII) progressive competition, through which greater coherence of conceptual usage 
FDQEHDFKLHYHG¶ 212  
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used linguistically is a misunderstanding, so it is not possible to conclude that because of this we are 
talking past each other or investigating different fields of enquiry. 
Part II- Multiple Truth Concepts: Making them Stick Together  
As we move away from defending against these potentially perceived issues, and on to consider how 
other theorists have applied intension and extension to unravel philosophical errors, it is worth bearing 
LQPLQGWKHIROORZLQJIURP+DOSLQ¶VDUWLFOH 
(A) term is frequently capable of conveying different meanings, so that theorist 1, in 
investigating field X with meaning 1, is involved in a totally different enterprise to that 
engaged by theorist 2, who is investigating field X with meaning 2.121 
As we will see, commentary around coherence theories appears to suffer from precisely this, and 
much more. The misconceptions besetting NEED can be seen, in some ways, in the work done on 
COHERENCE by Stephen Pethick. He demonstrates in µSolving the Impossible: The Puzzle of 
Coherence, Consistency and Law¶122 and in an article for Ratio JurisµOn the Entanglement of 
Coherence¶123 that philosophical discussion surrounding COHERENCE has wrapped itself in knots for 
not paying heed to the intension and extension of COHERENCE, leading to baffling conclusions.124 He 
puts it so: 
(D)espite the grave legal significance of the outcomes that are claimed for its employment, 
nobody has been able to agree what coherence actually is. Naturally enough, the difficulty 
encountered in setting down the meaning of the concept has been leapt upon by those 
sceptical of the claims made for it in application, for it can scarcely be solid ground to employ 
coherence in, say, reasoning to a verdict of guilt on a capital charge, if coherence itself 
remains an "elusive", "complex", or even "mystical" notion. Indeed, the small legion of its 
detractors is now so confident that one writer recently proclaimed (in a monograph entitled 
Against Coherence) that "defining coherence is logically impossible".125 
The literature surrounding COHERENCE is a harsh indictment of how neglecting intension and 
extension can result in the creation of philosophical approaches that only serve to complicate the 
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conceptual questions at play. As Pethick remarks in the above quote, this is particularly concerning in 
legal theory where the relevant concept is relied on in a legal context, yet is not properly understood, 
(universally, Pethick suggests),126 by theorists specifically examining the concept. Pethick claims this 
is caused by a lack of attention to the intension and extension of COHERENCE: 
This thesis is that jurists and others have disregarded the distinction between the intension and 
extension of coherence, and have thus come routinely to elide the meaning of coherence with 
various other features of the objects taken to instantiate it.127 
The similarities between this and P\FULWLFLVPRI%L[¶Vtreatment of NEED is no accident; 3HWKLFN¶V
paper is further demonstration of how attention to intension and extension can help elucidate 
apparently (falsely) complicated issues in language. Susan Haack, as we will see, demonstrates the 
same in relation to TRUTH. In %L[¶VWUHDWPHQWRINEED this disregard led him to conclude that the 
American courts were misusing NEED and FREEDOM, and different coherence theories have been led to 
various other untenable conclusions due to this neglect. As Pethick says in his paper: 
I argue that all present accounts of coherence suffer from a particular weakness, whether they 
DUHZULWWHQ³DJDLQVWFRKHUHQFH´« or are offered by advocates of its use... My contention is 
that legal theorists and other writers in philosophy, linguistics, literary criticism, and 
elsewhere have happened universally to misidentify characteristics of objects of which 
coherence may be predicated as characteristics of coherence itself.128    
Pethick displays evidence for three distinct claims, by a variety of theorists,129 which are made of 
COHERENCE as a result of this misunderstanding:  
(T)hat there is a single true coherence, in virtue of which other accounts or uses of coherence 
must be mistaken; or that there must be kinds or types or concepts of coherence; or that there 
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DUH VR PDQ\ GLIIHUHQW µFRKHUHQFHV¶ WKDW WKH SURVSHFW RI FRQFHSWXDO GHILnition is ruled out 
altogether.130   
Each of three claims leads down an unnecessarily complex and winding path, causing theorists to 
become wrapped up in semantics, and ultimately a defective understanding of COHERENCE in various 
fields. Balkin slips into one of these misconceptions, that occur without a careful distinction between 
a concept and what that concept is capable of being predicated: 
However, before we can begin our discussion of the specific form of understanding involved in 
judgments of legal coherence, we must first distinguish several different types of coherence.  
The first is the coherence of a set of factual beliefs, the second is the coherence of a normative 
system like the law, and the third is a question of logical or narrative coherence.131 
While Olsson reaches the opposite conclusion: 
(T)hat defining coherence is logically impossible, that there is no formula or statement, however 
long, which could do the job adequately«Just as there are no square circles, there is nothing 
out there that could play the role coherence is supposed to play.  The description of that role is 
itself incoherent.  Small wonder that there has been so little progress in defining coherence!132 
The claim by Olsson that COHERENCE LVµORJLFDOO\LPSRVVLEOH¶133 to define134 stands in contrast to the 
solution offered by Balkin, (WKDWµZHPXVW ILUVWGLVWLQJXLVKVHYHUDOGLIIHUHQWW\SHVRIFRKHUHQFH¶ but 
both solutions are unnecessary, as they are ultimately solving a problem that does not exist. Both 
proposed solutions are bizarre conclusions to draw from an analysis of COHERENCE as a concept when 
paying heed to its intension and potential extensions, which comfortably explains the variance in 
application of COHERENCE. As rebutted by Pethick: 
Any scepticism is understandable, for it can seem as if I am merely accusing theorists of 
misspeaking.  It is as if jurists and others could simply shuffle some of what was taken for 
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proposed is that it sticks together. How, or in consequence of what, some WKLQJRUVRPHWKLQJVµVWLFNWRJHWKHU¶LV
then answered by the nature of, or particular relationship between WKHREMHFWVWKDWFRKHUH¶ 
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intension into the category of extension, and we could proceed much as before, only now with 
more accurate labelling of parts.  To combat this perception I conclude by pulling together and 
emphasising the damage caused by the mistake to some of the claims made for coherence in 
the legal literature.135  
My considerations in chapter one, and what I go on to examine in chapter three and four, make it 
apparent the difficulty is not simply RQH RI FDWHJRULVLQJ DQG µVKXIIOLQJ¶ precisely what falls into 
intension and what into extension then moving smoothly onwards. Errors in reasoning are directly 
attributable to the neglect, and need to be substantially addressed. Pethick draws on commentary by 
Jonathan Morgan who claims within µTort, Insurance and Incoherence¶: 
Legal coherence, one would have thought, must be shared as a universal aspiration by 
ODZ\HUVDQGHYHQ OHJDOSKLORVRSKHUV«4XLWHZKDWµFRKHUHQFH¶UHTXLUHVKRZHYHULV
immensely controversial.136 
What COHERENCE requires linguistically is, despite claims to the contrary, clearly understood, not 
immensely controversial. It is not as if barristers arrive at court and are incapable of effectively 
employing coherence in discussion with a judge due to the controversial nature of COHERENCE. The 
multitude of deeply confused claims around COHERENCE share characteristics with the mistake I 
highlight by Bix in the previous chapter, and this is because it is the same error that is being made, 
just in a different context. He explains precisely what this error is: 
(I)n articulating coherence, C, theorists all happen to have in mind some x that instantiates it, 
and then draw on features of Cx in their attempt to determine C, causing the inadvertent 
imputation to C of characteristics possessed otherwise by the x in question.  Consequently, 
attempts to articulate the meaning of coherence have succeeded only in providing more or 
less detailed sketches of particular things that theorists suppose cohere, and which they 
happen to have in mind when bringing coherence into view.  This confusion accounts for the 
full range of problems and puzzles that are commonly held to beset the conceptual analysis of 
coherence, and which have, in turn, been taken to weaken the case for its use in law and other 
fields.137   
In a similar manner, Susan Haack explores confusion around TRUTH, and concludes the perceived 
difficulties that beset it can suitably be understood by separating TRUTH itself as a concept, the various 
extensions of which it is capable of being predicated: 
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My thesis, with respect to this use, will be that there is one truth, but many truths: i.e., one 
unambiguous, non-relative truth-concept, but many and various propositions, etc., that are 
true. One truth-concept: to say that a claim is true is to say (not that anyone, or everyone, 
believes it, or that it follows from this or that theory, or that there is good evidence for it, but) 
simply that things are as it says. But many truths: particular empirical claims, scientific 
theories, historical propositions, mathematical theorems, logical principles, textual 
interpretations, statements about what a person wants or believes or intends, statements about 
grammatical, social, or legal roles and rules, etc., etc.138 
 
Haack identifies that TRUE has a multitude of distinct uses and offers numerous examples of how each 
meaning can differ.139 She makes the claim WKDWWKHUHLVµRQHWUXWK-FRQFHSW¶: 
Someone might deny that there is one truth-concept either because he thinks that there is more 
than one such concept, or else because he thinks that there is none.140 
Such a denial would be to miss the point: a symptom of having mistakenly dug so deep into the 
pursuit of what TRUTH¶VµPHDQLQJ¶ is, (or NEED and &2+(5(1&(¶V meaning, for that matter) without 
regard for the dual nature of such concepts; a dual nature that is encapsulated in intension and 
extension. The similarities with the criticisms of COHEENCE we just saw are readily apparent in 
UHODWLRQWR+DDFN¶VDQDO\VLVRITRUTH here. The claim by Haack that accounting for our use of 
concepts like COHERENCE and NEED can be achieved optimally by stating there is one µtruth-concept¶ 
and multiple propositions which are capable of being true is, for all practical purposes, identical to 
articulating it via intension and extension. If we recall from chapter one, %L[¶Vmisunderstanding, and 
everything that fell out underneath it, could be resolved by attention to the same division. In addition, 
the perceived problems and proposed solutions found in literature regarding COHERENCE are 
practically identical. Haack summarises: 
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(T)here have been many who have held that all real truths, or perhaps all ultimate truths, are 
of just one kind141 
And: 
(P)erhaps it is no wonder that it has sometimes been supposed that true propositions are so 
varied and so heterogeneous that there can't be just one concept of truth, but must be many ± 
mathematical truth, scientific truth, legal truth, literary truth, and so forth. But the 
heterogeneity of true propositions doesn't require a plurality of truth-concepts.142 
In a later paper entitled The Whole Truth and Nothing but the Truth143 Haack demonstrates 
conclusively that her position is to be found entirely within the frame of intension and extension: 
7KHZRUG³WUXWK´LVVRPHWLPHVXVHGDVDQDEVWUDFWQRXQVRXVHGLWUHIHUVWRWKH 
concept of truth or, as some might prefer to say, to the property of being true, or to 
WKHPHDQLQJRIWKHZRUG³WUXH´DQGLWVV\QRQ\PVLQRWKHUODQJXDJHV,WLVDOVR 
sometimes used to refer to the things that fall in the extension of this concept; i.e., 
to true propositions, beliefs, statements, theories, etc.144 
Before moving on to a closer consideration of intension and extension, one of her opening remarks is 
well worth highlighting: 
Put like this, my thesis sounds almost embarrassingly simple, even naive. Still -- as Frank 
Ramsey said in a closely related context -- "there is no platitude so obvious that eminent 
phLORVRSKHUVKDYHQRWGHQLHGLW« it becomes apparent that my initial, simple formulation 
disguises many complexities.145 
Having to reiterate and unwind oversights caused by not properly parting a concept, and what that 
FRQFHSWLVDEOHRIEHLQJSUHGLFDWHGGRHVLQGHHGVRXQGµDOPRVWHPEDUUDVVLQJO\VLPSOHHYHQQDwYH¶ 
But when applied to the mistakes I have considered so far, and will go on to FRQVLGHUµLWEHFRPHV
apparent that my initial, simpOHIRUPXODWLRQGLVJXLVHVPDQ\FRPSOH[LWLHV¶Pethick remarked that, like 
COHERENCEµPDQ\RUGLQDU\FRQFHSWVPLJKWIHHOHTXDOSUHVVXUHMXVWZKHUHPXFKVWDQGVWREHJDLQHG
RUORVWXQGHUWKHLUXVH¶146 and in a legal context many ordinary concepts certainly do have much to be 
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gained or lost in their application. My suggestion that the neglect is wide spread can not, for practical 
reasons, be demonstrated conclusively; I provide evidence and reason to properly raise the question of 
whether it is wide spread beyond the examples I examine. My thesis has no greater aim than that, but 
covers a range of concepts, some in detail and some more briefly, to show the plausibility of this 
suggestion. After all, if %L[¶VFRQFHSWXDODQDO\VLVsuffers from the errors I highlight then that alone 
ought to be enough to raise the suggestion the same errors might be happening elsewhere and, as we 
have seen and will see, they are, in a variety of contexts. The role of intension and extension is well 
established in philosophy and grammar, it is not some abstract and poorly understood notion that has 
applicability in only a few niche areas. On the contrary, the notion is entirely applicable to all 
concepts and assists in solving a range of problems in conceptual analysis. It provides the tools to 
properly analyse language, through separating a concept and what that concept is properly able to 
attach to in extension, and assists in articulating what would otherwise be very difficult and laborious 
to communicate, if not impossible.  
The remaining chapters of this thesis will explore how spurious judgments can be reached if the 
intension and extension is neglected, and show how awareness of potential extensions leads to greater 
clarity in language and thought across all concepts. The neglect of intension and extension with regard 
to NEED goes further, and is neglected with other, legal and otherwise, concepts; increasing the need 
for a greater understanding.  
Part III- Making Sense of Concepts Related to Intension and Extension 
I have put forward the claim that my thesis is not dependent, nor stands or falls, on an esoteric 
understanding of meaning.147 Somewhat ironically, we have seen precisely this pursuit lead theorists 
to devalue and disregard intension and extension. To expand how my position does not rely on the 
specific or technical identification of meaning, it is worth examining an extract from Hilary Putnam in 
µ7KH0HDQLQJRI³Meaning´¶DILWWLQJWLWOHFRQVLGHULQJthe point): 
1RZFRQVLGHUWKHFRPSRXQGWHUPV³FUHDWXUHZLWKDKHDUW´DQGFUHDWXUHZLWKDNLGQH\´
Assuming that every creature with a heart possesses a kidney and vice versa, the extension of 
these two terms is exactly the same. But they obviously differ in meaning. Supposing that 
WKHUHLVDVHQVHRI³PHDQLQJ´LQZKLFKPHDQLQJ extension, there must be another sense of 
³PHDQLQJ´LQZKLFKWKHPHDQLQJRIDWHUPLVQRWLWVH[WHQVLRQEXWVRPHWKLQJHOVHVD\WKH
³FRQFHSW´DVVRFLDWHGZLWKWKHWHUP/HWXVFDOOWKLV³VRPHWKLQJHOVH´WKHintension of the term. 
The concept of a creature with a heart is clearly a different concept from the concept of a 
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creature with a kidney. Thus the two terms have different intension. When we say they have 
GLIIHUHQW³PHDQLQJ´PHDQLQJ LQWHQVLRQIntension and extension. Something like the 
preceding paragrDSKDSSHDUVLQHYHU\VWDQGDUGH[SRVLWLRQRIWKHQRWLRQV³LQWHQVLRQ´DQG
³H[WHQVLRQ´%XWLWLVQRWDWDOOVDWLVIDFWRU\:K\LWLVQRWVDWLVIDFWRU\LVLQDVHQVHWKHEXUGHQ
of this entire essay. But some points can be made at the very outset: first of all, what evidence 
LVWKHUHWKDW³H[WHQVLRQ´is DVHQVHRIWKHZRUG³PHDQLQJ´"7KHFDQRQLFDOH[SODQDWLRQRIWKH
QRWLRQV³LQWHQVLRQ´DQG³H[WHQVLRQ´LVYHU\PXFKOLNH³LQRQHVHQVHµPHDQLQJ¶PHDQV
extension DQGLQWKHRWKHUVHQVHµPHDQLQJ¶means meaning´. The fact is that while the notion 
RI³H[WHQVLRQ´LVPDGHTXLWHSUHFLVHUHODWLYHWRWKHIXQGDPHQWDOORJLFDOQRWLRQRItruth (and 
under the severe idealizations remarked above), the notion of intension is made no more 
precise than the vague (and, as we shall seePLVOHDGLQJQRWLRQ³FRQFHSW´148 
There are two relevantly VLJQLILFDQWSRLQWVPDGH)LUVWO\WKDWµPHDQLQJ¶LVQRWHDVLO\ORFDWHGLQ
intension, (nor extension), and attempts to use intension in this way is flawed.149 My thesis has a more 
basic target than such questions. Rather, it is an analysis of a perceived lack of attention to 
distinguishing between a concept and the object of which the concept is predicated. Or put 
alternatively, between the intension and extension of a concept. Questions like: µ(W)hat evidence is 
WKHUHWKDW³H[WHQVLRQ´is DVHQVHRIWKHZRUG³PHDQLQJ´"¶DUHRIDGLIIHUHQWQDWXUHWRWKHGLVFRXUVH,
undertake here.  
He remarks that µWKHQRWLRQRILQWHQVLRQLVPDGHQRPRUHSUHFLVHWKDQWKHYDJXHDQGDVZHVKDOOVHH
PLVOHDGLQJQRWLRQ³FRQFHSW´¶. The fact that Putnam DFNQRZOHGJHVµLQWHQVLRQ¶LVQRPRUHSUHFLVHWKDQ
µFRQFHSW¶LVVLJQLILFDQWDVµFRQFHSW¶LWVHOILVDFWXDOO\SUHFLVHHQRXJKIRUP\DQDO\VLV,IUHTXHQWO\
distinguish a concept in abstract and whatever that concept is predicated of in context, relying on 
H[SUHVVLRQVVXFKDVµWKHFRQFHSWNEED¶IRULQVWDQFHWRUHIHUWRNEED itself, unattached to any 
SDUWLFXODUSURSRVLWLRQ%\µWKHLQWHQVLRQRI1(('¶I am effectively communicating the same idea.  
Putnam¶VSRVLWLRQLV in relation to looking toward the intension, (or extension), WRILQGDFRQFHSW¶V
meaning; as opposed to any general criticism of its precision for other purposes. What intension 
constitutes precisely is comfortably left aside in analysing issues that might arise out of failing to 
discern between an object a concept is predicated of and that concept itself; which is as far as I rely on 
the notion of intension in confronting the problems I do. It is entirely irrelevant in my task to assess 
the ability for intension to bear the weight of abstract questions of meaning, or to articulate with 
exactness, in the way Putnam imagines, what intension constitutes.  
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There have been many methods developed in such a pursuit of meaning within a variety of 
philosophical traditions, (though it is typically associated with the analytic school of thinking), for 
instance that sought by the logical positivists: the reductive analysis of concepts in an attempt to 
identify the sum of their parts, with statements that were not empirically verifiable being cognitively 
insignificant.150 The verification principle151 held that a statement would not be cognitively meaningful 
unless its truth is empirically justifiable.152 Logical positivism was informed by a number of key 
philosophers and texts, including HDUO\:LWWJHQVWHLQLQµTractatus Logico-Philosophicus¶,153 Rudolf 
Carnap154 in µ7KH/RJLFDO6WUXFWXUHRIWKH:RUOG¶155 Frege, and Bertrand Russell who wrote the 
LQIOXHQWLDOµPrincipia Mathematica¶.156 Even late Wittgenstein concerned himself with this, in 
essence, despite his recommendations to abandon such pursuits as meaning is to be derived from the 
use, hence why he considered himself to be ending philosophy. Really, if he succeeded in this aim, it 
was an ending of a particular type of philosophy- the pursuit of meaning that dominated 
philosophy.157 In response to Principia Mathematica 1LFKRODV5HVFKHUZURWHµThe Distinction 
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EHWZHHQ3UHGLFDWH,QWHQVLRQDQG([WHQVLRQ¶158 which takes the position that philosophy can learn 
important lessons from intension and extension: 
I propose here to give some indications why the distinction between intension and extension, 
although of no critical significance for mathematics, not only is useful, but quite important for 
philosophical purposes.159 
And: 
For philosophical purposes ² for which, unlike mathematics, such contexts are clearly of 
fundamental importance ² it is necessary to insist upon maintenance of the distinction 
between properties in intension as opposed to properties in extension. Such considerations 
indicate that for philosophical uses the distinction between intension and extension is needed, 
and must be drawn with care, despite the fact that it does not arise in mathematics.160 
It is generally accepted that the principal aim of analytic philosophy is to elucidate conceptual 
questions,161 µDNLQGRILQWHOOHFWXDOWDNLQJWRSLHFHVRILGHDVRUFRQFHSWVWKHGLVFRYHULQJRIZKDW
HOHPHQWVDFRQFHSWRULGHDLVFRPSRVHGDQGKRZWKH\DUHUHODWHG¶.162 This concern with the elements 
of a concept or idea, what it is composed of, often formulates itself in the pursuit of information about 
the concept itself. Issues surrounding the intension of a given concept are frequently the aim of 
analysis. My claim is based on something more simplistic than the nature of such questions: the 
failure to pay attention to the relationship between a concept and its potential referents. Intension and 
extension simply expresses the, (one would imagine), uncontroversial view that concepts have both an 
intension, or conception, independent of any particular context, and a range of contexts of which the 
concept is capable of linking with in extension. It is in this way that the general argument of my paper 
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flies under the radar of these more removed and theoretical disputes that exist over the notion of 
meaning. Pethick puts it attractively in his treatment of COHERENCE: 
In this paper I am deliberately cavalier about the distinctions between meanings, concepts, 
conceptions, intensions and the like, precisely because my criticism has a more rudimentary 
target; i.e. the lack of interest in the relation between such meanings, concepts, intensions, 
etc., and their multiple referents in extension.163   
/LNH3HWKLFN¶VDUWLFOHP\WKHVLVFRQFHUQVµWKHODFNRILQWHUHVWLQWKHUHODWLRQEHWZHHQVXFKPHDQLQJV
concepts, intensionsHWFDQGWKHLUPXOWLSOHUHIHUHQWVLQH[WHQVLRQ¶as opposed to any questions 
holding to these other ambitions.  7KLVµUXGLPHQWDU\WDUJHW¶164 Pethick writes of however, does not 
take away from the seriousness of the error in question. If anything it makes it more important to 
correct mistakes surrounding it, as it is a fundamental building block of language use that is being 
ignored or abused. TKLVLVILWWLQJZLWK:LWWJHQVWHLQ¶Vstatement that: µ:KDWZHILQGLQSKLORVRSK\LV
trivial; it does not teach us new facts, only science does that. But the proper synopsis of these 
trivialities is enormously difficult, and has immense importance. Philosophy is in fact the synopsis of 
WULYLDOLWLHV¶165  
That troubled philosophical discourse can be unravelled and solved by utilising the intension and 
extension tool is made even more surprising by the fact similar distinctions (although by no means 
identical)166 have been present for a long time in philosophy through sense and reference: 
A proper name (word, sign, sign combination, expression) expresses its sense, stands for or 
designates its reference. By means of a sign we express its sense and designate its 
reference.167 
The German philosopher, Gottlob Frege, coined the term. The µVHQVHDQGUHIHUHQFH¶GLVWLQFWLRQRU
µ6LQQDQG %HGHXWXQJ¶, LQKLVIDPRXVSDSHUµhEHU6LQQXQG%HGHXWXQJ168 µ2Q6HQVHDQG
5HIHUHQFH¶).  The relevance of this to intension and extension is undoubtable; as David Chalmers 




 Ibid 15 
165










- 47 - 
 
opens On Sense and Intension with: µ,WKLQN)UHJHZDVFORVHUWRWKHWUXWKRQHFan articulate an aspect 
RIPHDQLQJZLWKPDQ\DOWKRXJKQRWDOORIWKHSURSHUWLHVWKDW)UHJHDWWULEXWHGWRVHQVH¶169 
)UHJH¶VSDSHU opens: 
Equality gives rise to challenging questions which are not altogether easy to answer. Is it a 
relation? A relation between objects, or between names or signs of objects? In 
my Begriffsschrift I assumed the latter. The reasons which seem to favour this are the 
following: a =  a and a =  b are obviously statements of differing cognitive value; a =  
a holds a priori and, according to Kant, is to be labelled analytic, while statements of the 
forma =  b often contain very valuable extensions of our knowledge and cannot always be 
established a priori«1RZLIZHZHUHWRUHJDUGHTXDOLW\DVDUHODWLRQEHWZHHQWKDWZKLFKWKH
names 'a' and 'b' designate, it would seem that a =  b could not differ from a =  a (i.e. 
provided a =  b is true).170 
I open by considering this extract because it raises a key issue that surrounds the notion of sense and 
reference, historically speaking. What Frege means by equality in this context is nothing more than 
the notion of two things being equal in a technical sense; that a equals a (a = a), and, a equals b (a = b) 
in some contexts are equal when it comes to denoting objects in the world. Frege uses numerous 
examples throughout the essay, some in particular I will consider below, but for now I will pose a 
hypothetical to bear in mind. It is unproblematic to assert Spiderman = Spiderman,171 (a = a), and as 
)UHJHSRLQWVRXWDWWKHVWDUWRIµ2Q 6HQVHDQG5HIHUHQFH¶WKe truth value of this statement can be 
determined a priori. It is different, at least in some ways, to say Spiderman = Peter Parker, (a = b). 
Explaining the significance of this puzzle in conceptual analysis was a significant LVVXHDQGµ2Q6HQVH
and RefereQFH¶ZDVpartly a discussion of this issue. This puzzle, referred to as the issue of 
substitutivity,172 described the problem that philosophy once had of trying to explain how using 
different terms to describe the same referent could have different cognitive significance. The problem 
of substitutivity supposedly emerges when we replace these two terms with each other in certain 
sentences, that is, two co-referential terms. Peter Parker and Spiderman are co-referential terms in that 
they share the same referent, DQG6XSHUPDQDQG&ODUNH.HQWIRUWKHVDPHUHDVRQ)RULQVWDQFHµ/RLV






 To adopt a popular way of exploring the issue in textbooks. Batman being Bruce Wayne, and Superman 
being Clarke Kent for example are provided in Lawrence Goldstein, Andrew Brennan, Max Deutsch and Joe 
Lau, Logic: Key Concepts in Philosophy (Bloomsbury 3PL 2005). More typical (and historical) examples may 
be Mark Twain and Samuel Clemens, or Cicero and Tully as in Anthony Grayling, Introduction to 
Philosophical Logic (first published 1982, 3rd edn Wiley-Blackwell 1997). 
172
 µ/RJLF.H\&RQFHSWVLQ3KLORVRSK\¶ 101 
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/DQHEHOLHYHVVXSHUPDQFDQIO\¶DQG/RLV/DQHEHOLHYHV&ODUN.HQWFDQIO\¶173 are clearly distinct, but 
explaining how this may be the case (in a theory that was consistent in other areas of philosophy) 
eluded philosophers. )UHJH¶VSURSRVHGVROXWLRQZDVWRGUDZDGLVWLQFWLRQEHtween what he described 
as the sense and reference of a concept. This essentially distinguishes the cognitive significance of the 
co-referents, (Clark Kent, and Superman).  
The usefulness of making a distinction of sense and reference was significant to philosophers in the 
19th and early 20th century partly because they were attempting to solve the particular issue of 
substitutivity. Intension and extension is as much a grammatical distinction as that of a philosophical 
one, (one could hardly successfully analyse language philosophically without close attention to 
grammar usage),174 yet its usefulness was perhaps overlooked with the overhaul of conceptual 
analysis that Wittgenstein and others caused in the 20th century.175 This may have been due to the 
seemingly overly-technical nature of intension and extension (in the sense that Putnam considers them 
above, for instance). It is not difficult to imagine the movement that rejected the hunt for meaning, 
beyond looking at how a concept is used, might casually discard intension and extension without 
appreciating its full value; though once again we are faced with a great irony: intension and extension 
possibly fell by the wayside during this transformation in philosophy, yet is a powerful means of 
DQDO\VLQJDFRQFHSW¶Vspecific, contextual use. While there are differences between sense/reference 
and intension/extension, what they fundamentally signify, that there is an important difference 
between concept and referent, is the common thread.176 It can be seen that intension and extension is 
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they conclude is insufficient reason), EXWWKH\FODLPWKDWµ&RQFHSWXDODQDO\VLVKDVKDGDORQJDQGYHQHUDEOH
history tracing back to the very origins of philosophy, but it took on a particularly heavy burden in the early 20th 
century when it was widely thought, following Carnap and others, that scientific concepts must be definable a 
SULRULDQGWKDWLW¶VSKLORVRSK\¶VMREWRIXUQLVKWKHGHILQLWLRQs. However, in the 1950s and 1960s, W.V.O. Quine 
and Hilary Putnam convinced many philosophers that this is a mistaken view. Quine and Putnam highlighted the 
limits of a priori inquiry, noting that science sometimes overturns even our most cherished beliefV¶254 
176
 A similar distinction exists between connotation and denotation, expanded by Mill in his System of Logic. As 
SXWIRUZDUGE\:LOOLDP3DUU\DQG(GZDUG+DFNHUµ/LWWOHVWDQGDUGL]DWLRQRIWHUPLQRORJ\KDVEHHQDFKLHYHGLQ
this area of logic. Some logiFLDQVXVH³H[WHQVLRQDVDV\QRQ\PIRU³GHQRWDWLRQ´DQG³FRQQRWDWLRQ´RU
³FRPSUHKHQVLRQ´DVV\QRQ\PRXVIRU³LQWHQVLRQ´Aristotelian Logic (State University of New York Press 1991) 
503. There is no value in dissecting these relationships for the purposes of my analysis. To do so would be to 
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not used consistently in modern conceptual analysis; while an interesting question, whether, and to 
what degree, this neglect is attributable to the rise of ordinary language philosophy is difficult to say. 
What can be said with certainty is that there is such neglect, and the consequences are significant for 
jurisprudence and law.  
So far, I have accounted for a few particular instances in which intension and extension resolves 
conceptual errors, in an article by a theorist prominent enough to question the potential pervasiveness 
of the neglect. This contention is supported by evidence from the literature surrounding both TRUTH 
and COHERENCE, enabling a wider scope for the idea that intension and extension has been abandoned 
in important ways within conceptual analysis. I have defended against potential critiques that may 
otherwise be perceived to damage my claims, and examined the notion of intension and extension in 
the necessary detail.  On the back of this analysis, I now proceed to explore the neglect of intension 
and extension within community care cases; examining how subtle changes to the extension NEED and 
NECESSITY can change how the concepts are understood in a legal context. The consequences of this 
vary from the needless complication of the legal issues at hand, to the potential for erroneous 











                                                                                                                                                              
begin to account for a general theory of what intension is constituted of, which as I have just explored, is an 
entirely different undertaking. 
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Chapter Three- µ1HHG¶ In Community Care 
Introduction 
In this chapter I will examine needs assessments;177 they determine the care provided for patients in 
social welfare and community care law, and can be better understood and applied through awareness 
of the split between 1(('¶s intension and extension. What I have put forward thus far will be 
considered in a directly legal context, though the core ideas developed in previous chapters remain the 
same. In certain circumstances, in order to determine a course of treatment for a patient, care givers 
are under a statutory duty to provide an assessment of their needs178 and provide treatment 
accordingly.179 Some of the problems I identify here are either incredible linguistic oversights by 
judges, or attempts to manipulate language to arrive at the conclusion they want, with scant regard for 
the legal decision that might otherwise properly be reached. I will draw particularly on a trio of cases 
concerning resource allocation: R(McDonald) v Kensington and Chelsea RLBC,180 and also R v 
Kirklees Ex P Daykin181 and R v Gloucestershire CC Ex P Barry.182 McDonald will be the primary 
focus of my analysis as it well demonstrates the point this chapter tries to make, and provides a good 
focal point to demonstrate how needs assessments can be analysed and helpfully informed by reliance 
on intension and extension.  
Judicial commentary around needs assessments has lacked necessary attention to the intension and 
extension of NEED, and many points of consideration spiral from this basic premise. A manipulation of 
what NEED is predicated of within an original needs assessment results in the demonstrable potential 
for needs assessments to be unenforceable by claimants against care providers. Initially, consider the 
following hypothetical. A health authority needs to allocate a certain level of financial support to a 
patient, patient X. Patient X, a competitive athlete, has a badly sprained leg and a decision has to be 
made as to what level of financial support will be offered. To simplify matters, OHW¶VVD\WKHlocal 
authority have concluded to either: provide a crutch and recommend rest, or regular physiotherapy to 
speed up recovery. They are under a statutory duty to conduct a needs assessment to make this 
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decision.183 7KLVDVRQHZRXOGH[SHFWLQYROYHVDQDO\VLQJWKHSDWLHQW¶Vneeds and providing a suitable 
treatment. Unsurprisingly, whether the needs assessment is satisfied or not will result in what the 
extension of NEED is, in the context of their needs assessment. If the need is to µachieve a full 
UHFRYHU\¶, then rest and a crutch will satisfy the requirement stating that NEED states. On the other 
hand, if LWLVµWKH level of support that will be necessary to achieve the speediest recovery to enable 
patient X to compete in a WRXUQDPHQWQH[WPRQWK¶WKH\ZLOOQHHGWRDOORFDWHDSK\VLRWKHUDSLVWWR
satisfy the need put forward by the test.184 Were it decided that recovery to compete was his specific 
need and he sought to enforce his needs assessment in court, one would expect that in court this is the 
particular extension of NEED that would be relied on in assessing whether a care giver breached their 
duty. Yet as we will see this is not always the case, and a general need is substituted for the specific 
one identified in the original needs assessment.  This is not just to take issue with the use of NEED 
based treatment on a solely linguistic level. It is a linguistic issue, but the consequences are 
extralinguistic; faulty decision making can potentially flow from the careless use of NEED within 
needs assessments.  
This leads the way for decision makers to ignore established treatment guidelines and provide the 
level of support they are comfortable to ZLWKVFDQWUHJDUGIRUDSDWLHQW¶VDFWXDOQHHGV To quote the 
Supreme Court: µ,WKDVEHHQHVWDEOLVKHGWKDWDORFDODXWKRULW\FRXOGODZIXOO\WDNHDFFRXQWRILWV
resources ZKHQPDNLQJDQDVVHVVPHQWRIQHHGV¶;185 the case R v Gloucestershire CC Ex P Barry186 
and a string of other cases187 in the House of Lords held that a decision maker, when making a needs 
assessment, can legally take account of the availability of their resources when allocating treatment. I 
am not suggesting it is a problem that decision makers have to make a decision based on the 
circumstances of their available resources. It could hardly be any other way, but the distinction made 
by the courts that supposedly resolves this issue, that of initially identifying a need and meeting said 
need, is less clear cut than commentary may suggest. These points will become much clearer when 
applied to case examples, but this preliminary statement is enough to be going on with; it is much 
better explained via demonstration.  
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Before going on to consider how McDonald and other cases fit into this picture, it will be of aid to 
provide a brief summary of the relevant legislation regarding community care needs assessments. The 
principal legislation concerning this is s 47 of the National Health Service and Community Care Act 
1990, containing the following: 
Subject to subsections (5) and (6) below, where it appears to a local authority that any person 
for whom they may provide or arrange for the provision of community care services may be 
in need of any such services, the authority² 
(a) shall carry out an assessment of his needs for all those services; and 
(b) having regard to the results of that needs assessment, shall then decide whether his needs 
call for the provision by them of any such services. 188 
There are other pieces of legislation which have general relevance (i.e. legislation which concerns 
disability care such as the National Assistance Act 1948, and the Chronically Sick and Disabled 
Persons Act 1970 s 2) but to go into detail on them here would be gratuitous. The relevant legislation, 
for the purposes of this analysis, is that which has bearing on needs assessments specifically. It is not 
possible to consider these other pieces of legislation in detail here, but I do explore them where they 
become relevant. I highlight the National Health Service and Community Care Act now so the quotes 
and considerations that follow are clearer when they make reference to it. 
The Disambiguation of Needs Assessments 
Social welfare has a strong reliance on the performance of needs assessments. The allocation of 
resources relating to social services, child care and medical resources all incorporate them. A failure 
to fulfil DSDWLHQW¶VQHHGDIWer a needs assessment may be actionable189, and a lack of such fulfilment 
was the claim made by McDonald.  Needs assessments are commonly and systematically relied on in 
community and social care, and within many sub-categories of these two areas: 
Assessment KDVDOZD\VEHHQLQWHJUDOWRVRFLDOZRUNSUDFWLFH6LQFHWKH¶VWKHUHKDVEHHQ
a steady increase in interest in the field of child care social work assessment, its importance in 
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social work practice is widely acknowledged. Assessments are undertaken by social workers 
to gain access to resources such as family support workers and social grants; and they are 
used by managers, courts and panels to inform the decision making process, consequently the 
social work assessment can have a lasting and profound impact upon children and their 
families.190 
The rather tragic circumstances of McDonald concerned Elaine McDonald, who was the prima 
ballerina of Scottish Ballet, until she suffered a stroke in 1999, leaving her with numerous disabilities, 
and unable to perform this role. This was not the direct subject of the proceedings before the court; 
McDonald also had a neurogenic bladder which led her to need to urinate more frequently than usual, 
(between two or three times in a night). Initially, as part of her care package provided by Kensington 
DQG&KHOVHD5R\DO/RQGRQ%RURXJK&RXQFLOµWKHFRXQFLO¶IURPKHUH on), she was identified to have 
the need of µassistance to use the commode at night¶,191 being unable to access it alone. After a while, 
the council started to suggest that instead of a night time carer to take care of her, McDonald could 
UHO\RQLQFRQWLQHQFHSDGVLQVWHDG$V/RUG%URZQSXWLWµ:KHWKHUQLJKW-time care can be provided on 
WKLVUHYLVHGEDVLVLVWKHFULWLFDOLVVXHLQWKHVHSURFHHGLQJV¶192 In 2008 the level of support provided 
was communicated to McDonald and she sought judicial review of the decision in the same year, 
EHLQJµDSSDOOHG¶DWWKHWKRXJKWRIEHLQJWUHDWHGDVLQFRQWLQHQWZKLFKVKHLVQRWDQGKDYLQJWRXVH
pads. 193  
The first instance of McDonald contains alarming remarks that directly threaten the sound 
applicability of needs assessments. These are not well handled by the Court of Appeal and scarcely 
mentioned by the Supreme Court nor the, recent, European Court of Human Rights decision.194 
Consequently the dangerous judicial reasoning is not properly resolved, and legal reliance on needs 
assessments is not properly protected from the error in question. The needs assessment that McDonald 
sought to rely upon contained help for µDVVLVWDQFHWRXVHWKHFRPPRGHDWQLJKW¶.195 Initially the High 
&RXUWKHOGWKDWZLWKLQWKLVDVVHVVPHQWRI0F'RQDOG¶VQHHGVDSHUPLVVLEOHUHDGLQJRIWKLVLVµDQHHG
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IRUVDIHXULQDWLRQDWQLJKW¶.196 I start by examining the commentary in the High Court, which refused 
the application to bring a case for judicial review,197 and go on to dissect how the Court of Appeal and 
WKH6XSUHPH&RXUWHDFKKDQGOHGWKLVµYHU\QDUURZ¶198 issue themselves.  
The needs based assessment WKDWFODVVLILHG0F'RQDOG¶VQHHG DVµDVVLVWDQFHWRXVHWKHFRPPRGHDW
niJKW¶ZDVGDWHG-XO\DQGFRPSOHWHGRQ2FWREHUDQGWKHDOOHJHGYLRODWLRQRIWKLV
DVVHVVPHQWIROORZHGLQ0F'RQDOG¶VDSSOLFDWLRQIRUMXGLFLDOUHYLHZZKLFKZDVLQLWLDOO\KHDUGLQ
Regarding the decision, the deputy judge said: 
The fundamental issue here is: what is the assessed need? Whatever it is, the defendant is 
obliged to meet it based on the application of the FACS criteria and its own eligibility criteria. 
It follows that at the end of the day there is a very narrow issue before me. The July needs 
assessment, which was carried out, and to which I have referred, described the need as being 
³QHHGVDVVLVWDQFHWRXVHWKHFRPPRGHDWQLJKW´The issue is whether that is to be taken 
literally, which would give rise to the claimant requiring assistance by way of a night-time 
carer, or whether one is to examine the underlying problem of need that gives rise to that 
assessment.199 (My emphasis) 
The end of that quote has great significance. The two options presented are either that needs 
assessments DUHWDNHQOLWHUDOO\RUWKHµXQGHUO\LQJSUREOHPRIQHHGWKDWJLYHVULVHWRWKDWDVVHVVPHQW¶
is read into the assessment, and the higher courts decide that the former is the correct approach. Lord 
Brown put the position so: 






or whether, as the respondents contended, it was permissible to examine its underlying 
rationale and treat it as a need for safe urination at night. Given that it was the latter, the 
deputy judge held that it was open to the respondents to meet that need in the more 
economical manner, ie by the provision of pads.200 
                                                   
196
 Ibid 1271 
197
 µIt is right, as Mr Rutledge reminds me, that we have in fact had a hearing, which would have been no 
different had it EHHQWKHVXEVWDQWLYHKHDULQJ¶ [2009] EWHC 1582 (Admin) 83 
198
 Ibid 1271  
199
 [2009] EWHC 1582 34 
200
 McDonald  [2011] UKSC 33 1271  
- 55 - 
 
There is no reasonable MXVWLILFDWLRQIRULWEHLQJµWKHODWWHU¶WKDWLWZDVSHUPLVVLEOHWRH[DPLQHWKH
needs assessments underlying rationale and treat it as a need for safe urination at night. If this is the 
case then there is no purpose to conducting a needs assessment, of which the specific referent in 
extension, µDVVLVWDQFHWRXVHWKHFRPPRGHDWQLJKW¶, was established. The council would be in 
violation of their duty if they did not keep to the needs assessment, and the needs assessment 
concluded McDonald required assistance to use the commode at night. How this can be read to mean 
supplying incontinence pads is not clear. The court decided that the council are allowed to meet 
0F'RQDOG¶VQHHGVLQDµPRUHHFRQRPLFDO manner¶;201 if they were to be frank they would admit that 
the council has not been able to, or does not want to, fulfil the obligations set out by the 2008 needs 
assessment, and allow the application for judicial review accordingly. Or alternatively, do not allow 
the application and be candid about the reason for not: because the original needs assessment was set 
too high and is too difficult for the authority to maintain. What happens instead is the court attempts 
to argue the original needs assessment can be read in a way that providing incontinence pads would 
continue to satisfy the terms of the needs assessment. ,I0F'RQDOG¶VQHHGFRXOGKDYHEHHQidentified 
in this way at the time of assessment, and the council wished to rely on it as such, then the 
µGHOLEHUDWHO\FKRVHQODQJXDJH¶202 ought not to have been chosen in the first place. The deputy judge in 
McDonald outlines her argument in the following quotation: 
As the judgment of Collins J in Daykin makes clear, in the circumstances of that case it was 
impossible to regard the provision of a stair lift at home as the need. It was the need to be able 
to get in and out of the premises, in that case, which was actually the need. Likewise, in this 
case, in my judgment, it is right to examine the underlying rationale for what is described as 
the assessed need. Here it is the consequence of the claimant's neurogenic bladder which 
means that she experiences frequency of urine. Because of that, she needs to get up and use 
the commode. Because of her physical impairment and frailty, she cannot do that without 
assistance, or she is exposed to a real risk of injury, as has happened in the history that I have 
set out, with serial hospital admissions as a result of her falls. The core need, then, is the 
safety of the claimant, in my judgment.203 
Here we are introduced to the dubious µFRUHQHHG¶RIWKHµVDIHW\RIWKHFODLPDQW¶. Let us recap. So far 
we have seen the development of the original needs assessment (µDVVLVWDQFHWRXVHWKHFRPPRGHDW
QLJKW¶)WRµWKHXQGHUO\LQJUDWLRQDOH¶RIWKHDVVHVVPHQWWRDJHQHUDOµVDIHW\RIWKHFODLPDQW¶With each 
step we move further away from the purpose and entire point of undertaking an assessment. An 
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argument is being made here that the July needs assessment was actually some form of general needs 
DVVHVVPHQWUDWKHUWKDQDVSHFLILFVROXWLRQWR0F'RQDOG¶VSUREOHP, but surely this is always to be the 
case in the allocation of care resources. The alternative to this is if care givers did not take into 
account the conditions of the patient and allocated random treatments that are irrelevant to patient¶s 
conditions, rather than paying general attention to their µFRUHQHHGV¶.204 That the needs of a patient 
should be taken account of generally is a given, needs assessments are to determine specific needs and 
solutions. In other words, making a needs assessment presumes attention to the individual¶VJHQHUDO
needs in the first place; the nature of the assessment made in July was to arrive at a specific solution to 
McDonalds needs, taking into account her condition and what options are available, and the decision 
they arrived at was to have assistance to use the commode at night. It is this which patients are meant 
to be able to rely on, yet the analysis offered in McDonald undermines the fundamental way in which 
the whole process of needs assessments operates to the severe detriment of patients everywhere.  
The higher courts briefly cast aside this linguistic issue, recognising that something has gone wrong in 
the analysis of the High Court but are in no way thorough, specific or explore the consequences, and 
dangers, of avoiding this kind of thinking in judicial decision making. In Barry it is said: 
Section 47(2) ensures that a local authority when conducting an assessment of the need for 
community care services make a specific finding in respect of the need for community care 
services make a specific finding in respect of the needs of a disabled person for services under 
section 2 of the Act of 1970.205 
The lack of value in needs assessments is evident if only general needs are considered. Failing to 
provide DµVSHFLILFILQGLQJLQUHVSHFWRIWKHQHHGVRIa disabled person¶ means that one can play 
around with the referent of the assessment and any support option will be acceptable, based on the 
general assessment. Mc'RQDOG¶VJHQHUDOQHHGWRXULQDWHVDIHO\FRXOGEHPHWE\SURYLGLQJ
incontinence pads, but her need to use a commode at night, with assistance, can not. The significance 
of this distinction is clear enough and must be properly examined and defended against.  Describing 
WKHLVVXHDVµYHU\QDUURZ¶LVFRUUHFWEXWQRWjust in the way that the judge suggests. There is little 
room for manoeuvre within the needs assessment provided by the council: assistance to use the 
commode at night. The only way out (generally) for a court that wants to decide against supporting 
the original referent of NEED within a needs assessment is to rescind on the needs assessment that was 
established, or as the option that was taken, illegitimately reinterpret the assessment.  
Since the legality of care givers actions can be decided by the satisfaction of a needs assessment, 
careful attention to whether they actually have done so is, naturally, essential. Unfortunately, as we 
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are beginning to see, manipulating the extension of NEED in the assessment enables this element of 
legal protection for patients to be potentially ineffective. The Court of Appeal in McDonald hold that 
the council did have to conduct a new assessment iQRUGHUWRFKDQJH0F'RQDOG¶VWUHDWPHQW, since the 
2008 needs assessment was sufficiently clear to not be allowed to be read in a general way: 
However, the language of the July 2008 assessment was deliberately chosen, and not the 
result of any error. Accordingly, the local authority had been in breach of its duty in deciding 
not to provide means to meet the assessed need of assistance to access the commode at 
night.206 
The Court of Appeal was correct to hold this point of view, although the reasons why are not nearly 
sufficiently explored in the judgment. The reasoning of the High Court was dangerous in two ways. 
Firstly, needs assessments become unable to be relied upon in any meaningful manner. Secondly it 
demonstrates either a judicial misunderstanding of key legal issues, or more speculatively and 
malevolently, a willingness to exploit language to reach decisions it otherwise legally could not, or at 
least, would have to justify in a different, more honest, way. Both these are a cause for concern, the 
first of which raises more immediate and direct concerns for those seeking to enforce and rely upon 
their own needs assessments.  
On appeal to the Supreme Court, the decision of the Court of Appeal was upheld, despite a minority 
disagreement.207 There are a few distinct legal issues that were in dispute in this case, partly relating to 
0F'RQDOG¶VFRQWHQWLRQWKDWWKHGHFLVLRQRIWKHFRXQFLOYLRODWHGKHUDUWLFOHrights; an issue that 
recently went all the way to Strasbourg,208 though none of the issues considered in the ECtHR 
decision are relevant to my focus, the court held in favour of McDonald insofar as there was an article 
8 breach, but that:  
The Court is satisfied that the national courts adequately balDQFHGWKHDSSOLFDQW¶VSHUVRQDO
interests against the more general interest of the competent public authority in carrying out its 
social responsibility of provision of care to the community at large. It cannot, therefore, agree 
with the applicant that there has been no proper proportionality assessment at domestic level 
and that any reliance by it on the margin of appreciation would deprive her of such an 
assessment at any level of jurisdiction.209  
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These aspects of the trial are LUUHOHYDQWWRWKHUHPLWRIWKLVSDSHUIRUWKH\GRQ¶WLQIOXHQce the issues 
being discussed here in any significant way. Much of the case deals with other issues, i.e. whether it is 
desirable to legally allow the council to make this decision with regard to human rights,210 or whether 
relying on incontinence pads in place of a night time carer is a proportionate means of achieving a 
legitimate aim.211 Both these are issues which the case ought to revolve around in an attempt to best 
resolve them, but this task is made more difficult by problems prompted by misunderstandings of 
language that can adequately be pushed aside by attention to intension and extension. Confusion 
encountered in these judicial misconceptions can be accounted for by a lack of attention to the 
intension and extension and its application to NEED. Unravelling the issues that arise through this 
inattention requires close examination, but yields interesting conclusions. 
So, the judge at first instance resolved the case in favour of the council, commenting on the described 
needs of McDonald being the need for µDVVLVWDQFHWRXVHWKHFRPPRGHDWQLJKW¶DQGPDNLQJWKHSRLQW
WKDWµLWZDVRSHQWRWKHUHVSRQGHQWVWRPHHWWKDWQHHGLQ a more economical manner¶.212 It is at this 
point that the significance of the mistake begins to fully bare its teeth. The assessment oI0F'RQDOG¶V
QHHGVUHVXOWHGLQKHUUHTXLULQJµDVVLVWDQFHWRXVHWKHFRPPRGHDWQLJKW¶DYHU\VSHFLILFQHHG7KH
general need that McDonald faced was assigned this specific solution. That the council may, by 
providing incontinence pads, be able to meet thiVµLQDPRUHHFRQRPLFDOPDQQHU¶LVDVWUDQJHFlaim, 
and the Court of Appeal does not address this. They are not meeting it at all; it is being ignored for a 
different solution; not providing assistance to use the commode at night, but providing incontinence 
pads. This may be necessary due to funding or some other reason but there is no justifiable reason to 
undertake the farce that the original needs assessment, with the specific extension of need to use the 
commode at night, is being met when it simply is not. If, to meet the needs assessment in a more 
economical manner, the council hired a cheaper, less qualified carer then this would make sense. It 
would be meeting the identified need in a more economical manner. But to simply pursue a different 
aim entirely by changing the extension NEED attached to in the original needs assessment, in an effort 
to maintain the integrity of the original needs assessment, is deeply misguided. The influence of 
resources in identifying needs in needs assessments is a relevant consideration, to which I return 
shortly. 
At the Court of Appeal the decision again went against McDonald, but the court took issue with the 
+LJK&RXUW¶VSRLQWWKDWWKHµGHOLEHUDWHO\FKRVHQ¶ODQJXDJHRIWKHDVVHVVPHQWDVVLVWDQFHWRXVHWKH
commode at night), could be read in the narrow sense of allowing incontinence pads to meet this 
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need.213 7KH+LJK&RXUW¶VDSSURDFKLVQRWKRZHYHU, a matter of reading the need to have access to a 
commode in a narrow way, it is reading it in a nonsensical way. Although the Court of Appeal is right 
to comment and criticise the reasoning of the High Court, the inaccuracy, brevity and lack of 
substantial criticism around this fundamental mistake, which threatens the functional reliability of 
needs assessments, is not sufficient. The vague argument by the Court of Appeal, that the language 
XVHGE\WKHFRXQFLOZDVµGHOLEHUDWHO\FKRVHQ¶LVDOHJLWLPDWHRQHDQG not recognising this severely 
undermines the integrity of needs assessments. A court may wish to disregard a needs assessment that 
a local authority/decision maker agreed on, and refuse to enforce the assessment; but to claim that the 
original needs assessment is being satisfied by changing what referent NEED is predicated of in 
extension within the assessment is misleading and bewildering.  
Not to take the original needs assessment literally is not simply a matter of general methods of 
statutory interpretation, such as literal, golden, mischief, etc, although the court hints at the 
similarities.214 Literal interpretation is a form of statutory and judicial interpretation of course,215 as 
are the aforementioned but my contention rests on the idea that taking the needs assessment in any 
other form than its literal meaning leaves scope to effectively make the assessment redundant and 
unenforceable. Except in the obvious way that a needs assessment is not a statute, literal interpretation 
in judicial reasoning generally is only indirectly relevant to the point here (there is a legitimate 
argument to be KDGDERXWZKHWKHUWDNLQJ3DUOLDPHQW¶VLQWHQWLVSUHIHUDEOHRUQRW, but this is an entirely 
separate question).216 There is no other sensible position other than to take a needs assessment at its 
literal value, due to the error I highlight.217 When implementing needs assessments taking the 
assessment any other way than literally greatly undermines the usefulness (and enforceability) of any 
such assessment.  
I do not suggest that it should not open to the court to make a decision that conflicts with the original 
assessment, it may well be on a case by case basis, but it should be admitted that the needs 
assessment, in light of the availability of resources, etc, is unable to be upheld. This is starkly different 
to changing the referent of the assessment to be very wide that allows one to arrive at any non-
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ridiculous treatment option WKDWILWVZLWKDQH[WUHPHO\JHQHUDOµFRUHQHHG¶RIWKHSDWLHQW. By way of            
analogy, the High Court compared the position of McDonald to Daykin: 
(I)n the circumstances of that case (Daykin) it was impossible to regard the provision of a 
stair lift at home as the need. It was the need to be able to get in and out of the premises, in 
that case, which was actually the need. Likewise, in this case, in my judgment, it is right to 
examine the underlying rationale for what is described as the assessed need.218 
The claim that McDonald is analogous to R v Kirklees Ex P Daykin in this way consequently requires 
scrutiny, and is fruitful in its own regard. Daykin involved an elderly couple, the wife suffered from 
rheumatoid arthritis, the husband from chronic obstructive airways disease, both of which left the 
FRXSOHZLWKµDQLQDELOLW\WRXVHVWDLUVRIDQ\VRUWDQDEVROXWHLQDELOLW\LQWKHFDVHRI0U'D\NLQD
virtual inability in the case of Mrs Daykin¶.219 Upon assessment the following options were 
considered: 
Following considerable discussion, three options were suggested in order to meet Mr 
Daykin's need: 
1. Rehousing - Mr and Mrs Daykin do not wish to be rehoused. 
2. Vertical lift shaft. 
3. Curb stair lift to incorporate both flights of stairs.220 
A recommendation, and formal recommendation, respectively was made that: 
In the course of consideration of their needs, the occupational therapist a Mrs Hirst, who is 
employed by the Health Authority recommended that instead of a moving to other premises 
they should have either a shaft lift or a stair lift installed at the premises thus enabling both of 
them to get in and out without having to climb.221  
And: 
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Mrs Hirst, the Senior Occupational Therapist, made a formal recommendation that there 
should be an installation of a stair lift and the additional works as discussed on a joint site 
visit with the surveyor to the council222  
Based on these the occupational therapist recommended that a stair lift be installed opposed to moving 
to the ground floor of the building, estimated at £15,000 instead of £3000 for moving.223 It is of note 
that part of the case in Daykin was that a formal needs assessment was never undertaken: 
The problem in this case, as it seems to me, is that the local authority never carried out their 
duty under section 47 and section 2 to assess the needs and to indicate what were the services 
that needed to be provided to meet those needs. Mr Friel submits that the recommendation 
made by the Social Services person responsible and the requisition, as it were, put to the 
Housing Department constitute an assessment and the necessary decision to provide the 
services which, in this case, involved the provision of the stair lift.224 
This lack of a formal needs assessment under s 47 and s 2, however, changes very little in 
demonstrating the philosophical and legal point. Whether the official recommendation made 
constituted a needs assessment in technical terms is a separate question for the court to decide, and it 
is argued over: 
Mr Straker points out that there is no delegated right for the person making the 
recommendation to make a decision which is the responsibility of the Council.225 
But as Judge Collins says: 
I do not think it is necessary to go into the details. Suffice it to say that the purpose of such a 
care plan is clearly to indicate the needs and to indicate what is to be done in order to meet 
those needs. This particular care plan is put forward by Janet Hallas, the Advocate Officer, 
but, so far as I can see and indeed there is no suggestion to the contrary, is not specifically 
approved by anyone in the council who had power to approve it. Nevertheless, it seems to 
have been acted upon and care in accordance with it was provided. 226   
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Accordingly the lack of a formal needs assessment is irrelevant for my analysis; besides the fact it is 
analogously referred to in Mcdonald, what the occupational therapist recommended is identical to 
what a needs assessment is. 
A claim for judicial review was made after the original recommendation of installing a stair lift was 
changed to that of having a ground floor flat. :KHWKHULWLVLPSRVVLEOHµWRUHJDUGWKHSURYLVLRQRID
VWDLUOLIWDWKRPHDVWKHQHHG¶UHIHUVWRZKHWKHUWKHVWDLUOLIWLVWKHneed, or the means of meeting a 
need, a distinction made in Barry and continued in Daykin and McDonald. It is clear that the 
availability of resources for a local authority is a relevant, and potentially confusing, factor for needs 
assessments. Attempts to meet needs economically have caused difficulties of the type I explore 
above. In order to prevent resource concerns leaking into needs assessments inappropriately, there 
H[LVWVDGLVWLQFWLRQEHWZHHQµLGHQWLI\LQJDQHHG¶DQGµPHHWLQJDQHHG¶.  
Barry, which I have already cited, makes clear, financial considerations cannot enter into the 
assessment of needs whereas they can enter into the question as to how those needs are to be 
met.227  
While it is sensible for decision makers to have the ability to consider available resources when 
conducting a needs assessment228 there are procedures in place to ensure resources do not become a 
factor too invasive on properO\DVVHVVLQJDSDWLHQW¶VQHHGVThis is attempted by splitting a first stage 
RILGHQWLI\LQJDSDWLHQW¶VQHHGVUHJDUGOHVVRIresources available), and secondly meeting said need 
and what may be done to address it. For instance McDonald concerned two competing treatment 
options: assistance to use a commode at night or incontinence pads. Initially the council decided her 
needs were best dealt with by assistance to use a commode but later wished to change this to the use 
of incontinence pads. Judicial commentary around this is quite revealing and it is a crucial distinction, 
a focus point within some key cases: 
Section 47(1) of the Act of 1990 establishes a two-stage framework for local authorities 
considering a community care provision for an individual person, viz, the assessment stage 
(paragraph (a)) and the provision stage (paragraph (b)). The language of the subsection 
suggests that the identification of need in the assessment decision is not necessarily 
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determinative of whether services will be provided to meet all or some of the assessed 
needs229  
Legally the assessment stage should not take heed of available resources, but the provision stage 
should: µConfusion arises if the stages are telescoped¶.230 If resources are considered in the provision 
stage they will play a strong role and potentially dictate the treatment offered, but if they are 
considered in the assessment stage, this is a near certainty since as the analysis of the existence of the 
need will be influenced by the availability of resources in providing for that need.   
Collins J in Daykin puts it so: 
Once the needs have been established, then they must be met and cost cannot be an excuse for 
failing to meet them. The manner in which they are met does not have to be the most 
expensive. The Council is perfectly entitled to look to see what is the cheapest way for them 
to meet the needs which are specified.231  
They are µentitled to meet the needs which are specified¶, using the cheapest methods available, but if 
this is not to meet the needs specified by the needs assessment, then there is little point in conducting 
one in the first place when it comes to litigating on the basis of a failure to meet that specific need. 
5HFDOOKRZµDVVLVWDQFHWRXVHWKHFRPPRGHDWQLJKW¶ZDVLQMcDonald, read in a way that 
LQFRQWLQHQFHSDGVFRXOGEHFRQVLGHUHGPHHWLQJWKHQHHGLQDµPRUHHFRQRPLFDOPDQQHU¶Yet, 
confusion is encountered in determining where the line between identifying a need and meeting a 
need may be drawn: 
In the context of section 2 of the 1970 Act, it is not always easy to differentiate between what 
is a need and what is merely the means by which such need can be met. I say that because if 
one looks at the judgments in the  Barry  case one sees that Swinton Thomas LJ at page 439 
pointed out that some of the matters in section 2(1) of the 1970 Act may be regarded as 
themselves needs as opposed to the means of meeting the needs. For example, he says, if the 
need is a provision for the TV set (that is within section 2(1)(b)) that need can be met by the 
provision of a new or a second-hand set. It may be said that the need is a need for contact with 
the outside world in some form or another and that the television set provides that contact. 
Thus the television set is the means whereby the need is to be met.232 
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Lord Lloyd in Barry provides some disconcerting commentary over the role NEED plays linguistically 
and legally: 
(T)he starting-point of the whole exercise is the assessment of his individual needs. The 
assessment is, to adopt the departmental jargon, "needs-led." The word "need" like most 
English words has different shades of meaning. You can say to an overworked Q.C. at the end 
of a busy term "You look as though you need a holiday." The word "need" in section 2 is not 
used in that sense; which is not to say that there may not be disabled people living in very 
restricted circumstances who may not need a holiday in the sense which Parliament intended. 
To need is not the same as to want. "Need" is the lack of what is essential for the ordinary 
business of living.233 
There are two key points to be extracted here. Firstly, that NEED KDVµGLIIHUHQWVKDGHVRIPHDQLQJ. 
You can say to an overworked Q.C. at the end of a busy term "You look as though you need a 
holiday.¶aQGWKDWµ7RQHHGLVQRWWKHVDPHDVWRZDQW1HHGLVWKHODFNRIZKDWLVHVVHQWLDOIRUWKH
RUGLQDU\EXVLQHVVRIOLYLQJ¶ On the face of it these seem like contradictory claims but /RUG/OR\G¶V
statement here probably means simply that NEED is to be used restrictively within needs assessments; 
that is to say the extension of NEED in that context is limited to the ordinary business of living, not 
needing/wanting holidays, (I return to this). It is not that need has many different meanings in 
intension, that here is articulated as havinJµGLIIHUHQWVKDGHVRIPHDQLQJ¶;234 it is simply that there are 
multiple referents it is capable of linking with in extension. The vagueness that attaches to this is not 
necessarily a problem,235 and being clear on what referent NEED is relying on in a legal context helps 
to get to the substantial, root issues of the case; rather than getting wrapped up in confusing dialogue 
about whether the claimant really needs a certain form of treatment. One can imagine meetings of 
people who end up debating NEED itself in this way without realising it,236 with a variety of disastrous 
consequences. In this way they may end up talking past one another through separate reliance on 
competing definitional scopes of NEED, potentially missing the core issues that are up for discussion, 
debating them through a faulty lens of NEED.  
This dichotomy between WANT and NEED is not solved, ZKHQ/RUG/OR\GVD\Vµ"Need" is the lack of 
ZKDWLVHVVHQWLDOIRUWKHRUGLQDU\EXVLQHVVRIOLYLQJ¶ only greater confusion is found. The perceived 
difficulty of deciding what is a NEED is merely shifted onto ESSENTIAL. The same problem presents 
itself, just represented by different terminology!  
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Greater difficulty is encountered when we consider arguments put forward in Barry: 
On a plain reading of "needs" and "necessary" (in section 2 of the Chronically Sick and 
Disabled Act Persons Act 1970) according to their ordinary meaning and dictionary 
definitions, the cost and availability of what is said to be wanting may be a relevant and 
sometimes a decisive consideration in deciding whether a need exists and whether it is 
necessary to supply something to meet it. None of the dictionary definitions excludes the 
DYDLODELOLW\RIUHVRXUFHVDVDFRQVLGHUDWLRQ¶The relative cost, etc., will be balanced against 
the relative strength of the requirement. In answer to the question, "Do you need a car, coat, 
drink (or any domestic article)?" a person may sensibly and relevantly respond "How much 
will it cost?" So too with services, domestic examples may be given.237  
One should take issue with the claim that µthe cost and availability of what is said to be wanting may 
be a relevant and sometimes a decisive consideration in deciding whether a need exists and whether it 
is necessary to supply something to meet it¶It is agreeable that the identification of a need is capable 
of being influenced by resources, but LWVKRXOGQ¶W The cost and availability is potentially a µGHFLVLYH¶
consideration in deciding whether a need exists, but the influence from any such resources is 
LOOHJLWLPDWHLQWKHSXUVXLWRILGHQWLI\LQJDSDWLHQW¶VQHHG,WLVDEVXUGWRVD\WKDWVLPSO\VHHLQJLI
VRPHRQHKDVDQHHGZLOOµEHEDODQFHGDJDLQVWWKHUHODWLYHVWUHQJWKRIWKHUHTXLUHPHQW¶The 
identification of a need will only be µbalanced against¶238 the referent in extension- LHµ,QHHGWRJHW
to town on time if I am to make my haircut DSSRLQWPHQW¶:KHWKHU,KDYHHQRXJKPRQH\WRDFWXDOO\
do this does not, even remotely, enter into whether the need exists or not. In meeting the need I may 
decide to run, (not recommended), take a bus, or a taxi depending on my available resources but this 
is quite surely a matter of meeting the need (getting to town in time), not identifying it. This simple 
example highlights how the identification and meeting of a need in needs assessments is divided, and 
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the way in which resources influence the identification of a need can be demonstrated further if we 
extend the example. In originally identifying my need for a haircut I might (aware of the fact I only 
have £1.20 on mHDQGFDQ¶WHYHQDIIRUGDEXV question whether I even really need one in the first 
place; I would, by my initial formulation, still need a haircut, but I would be shifting the referent in 
extension to something more difficult to satisfy. NEED has not changed; the referent has. Lord Lloyd 
by no means lets this argument slide, and does a reasonable job of explaining the error,239 given the 
brevity with which he addresses the issue, but it is not, once more, comprehensive enough, allowing 
the heart of the problem to go unexamined. Instead only the symptom is addressed, paving the way for 
further misunderstanding since the potential fundamental unreliability of needs assessments is not 
dealt with in any substantive manner.  
Thus we arrive at the final chapter, which takes a fresh perspective on what I have accounted for so 
far. Each chapter up to here has developed different aspects of my overall premise. Chapter one set us 
on the road, displaying misconceptions at the top of legal theory; a theme continued in chapter two in 
part, through investigation into what other theorists account for under those same misconceptions. 
Alongside this, in contrast to the specificity of my other chapters, chapter two delved into general 
issues raised by my investigation in order to bolster my defences and arm my assault where necessary.  
This led us into the current chapter, where we saw how, in at least one wide area of law, what is 
seemingly an esoteric and semantic contention has caused assessable (and, happily, repairable) 
damage. Chapter four might appear to move away from my focus on NEED, with considerations on the 
defence of necessity, though we actually remain right next to NEED throughout. The following chapter 
relies on all I have accounted for so far, and it will become apparent that the ailment NEED suffers is 
closely informed by analysing NECESSITY generally and as an aspect of the defence of necessity. The 
defence also brings a unique perspective to the mistakes that beset NEED, while still providing a new 
context in examining what is at stake when we neglect intension and extension. 
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Chapter Four- µNecessity¶ in Criminal Law 
Part I- Judging a Predicate on its Subject 
Necessity, that great refuge and excuse for human frailty, breaks through all law; and he is not 
to be accounted in fault whose crime is not the effect of choice, but force.240  
Though only recently developed,241 and existing in various forms,242 there is a defence of necessity, or 
duress,243 LQWKHFULPLQDOODZµµQHFHVVLW\¶ ZLOOH[FXVHDOODFWVZKLFKZRXOGRWKHUZLVHEHDFULPH¶.244 
The points made in this paper about NEED can be applied equally to NECESSITY and, firstly, I will 
explore their relation to each other. We saw in chapter one that Bix would track 1(('¶s use in one 
context, (destitution, for instance), and apply the associations it has there in an entirely different 
invocation. This is prevalent in relation to many concepts. Although the bulk of this paper focuses on 
examining NEED, it is not to deviate from this analysis to discuss NECESSITY. NECESSITY and NEED 
share a particular affinity with regard to the analysis this paper undertakes. Both have a distinct role in 
the application of legal tests, upon which trials may entirely hinge. Thus, a full and comprehensive 
understanding of their application both in civil and criminal law is desirable. While this is true of a 
vast range of concepts, and intension and extension can inform these as well, NEED and NECESSITY 
have a particularly close relationship, and the examination of the latter enhances my analysis of the 
former in a unique way.  
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 Attributed to Seneca in Pierre Charron, Of wisdom: The Second and Third Books (Translated by George 
Stanhope, London: 1707) 28 and in Watson Adams, The Rule of Life: A Collection of Moral Sentences 
(Hartford: 1834) 17 
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and argues for a marriage of the various sub-VHWVRIQHFHVVLW\EDVHGGHIHQFHVµ:KDWKDVEHHQVRXJKWWREH
demonstrated is that the distinction is not helpful when considering the relationship between self-defence, duress 
by threats and circumstances and necessity. The present separate classification of these defences has meant that 
they have developed differently--but the differences in the rules are not necessarily rational or sustainable. A 




FLUFXPVWDQFHV´:KLOHWKHFRQWRXUVRIWKLVGHIHQFHhave been largely linked to those of duress by threats, it has 
ORQJEHHQFRQFHGHGWKDWWKLVLVLQUHDOLW\DGHIHQFHRIQHFHVVLW\¶Ibid 13 
244
 Dudley 227 
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One of the primary misconceptions I have highlighted in different ways so far, (the accidental 
imputation of properties one particular extension a concept is capable of having onto the concept 
itself), is closely informed by judicial application of the defence of necessity. Through this scope I 
push further the idea that the reason NEED and NECESSITY are sometimes jealously guarded in support 
of preferred invocations, (invocations such as µEDVLFPLQLPDOUHTXLUHPHQWVRIOLIH¶ and others like 
µVXUYLYDO¶seen in this chapter), is simply because those particular extensions are perceived as more 
important.  Consequently, the sense of urgency that properly attaches to the isolated referent in 
extension permanently mars the concepts application elsewhere, leading to misconceptions of the 
concept in these other contexts.  
I will examine what the courts have to say about NECESSITY in criminal law: exploring how the 
potential referents of NECESSITY within the legal defence are very limited; and to instances of relative 
importance. As we will see, the defence of necessity in criminal law is generally restricted to what one 
would fairly conceive of as important circumstances: roughly what actions were necessary for the 
preservation of life. Judges, in applying the defence, have a much firmer grasp of the problems that 
would otherwise be caused by ignoring intension and extension simply due to a lack of variety in what 
NECESSITY can attach to in the defence. It is not necessarily that judges understand the value in 
separating a concept and referent particularly well in the defence; it is, at least in part, that there is less 
room for error due to the legally acceptable245 referents happening to be highly constrained. Moreover 
they are limited to relatively untroubled territory for NECESSITY: the prevention of serious physical 
harm or death. Where a legal concept like NECESSITY or NEED has very few available extensions in 
which legal enforceability is possible, and these are restricted to important extensions only, mistakes 
around language are less liable to occur. Crucially though, and herein partly lies the value of 
comparing the defence of necessity with my previous considerations, this clarity need not be present 
solely where the potential extensions of a legal concept are extremely limited, and to important 
situations. It is possible to achieve this state of precision at all times through attention to the intension 
and extension of the relevant legal concept.  
While this point remains the same, the defence is not necessarily immune to confusion even where the 
referent is as constrained as it is. It may be the case that judges do impute properties of one particular 
referent onto NECESSITY, but the mistake is hidden since the defence is not applied to other referents 
beyond this particular conception. In this way, associations or connotations evoked by the particular 
invocation of NECESSITY remain attached to this context alone. This would be seemingly 
inconsequential, since the features being imputed onto NECESSITY would be relevant in context: any 
features being imputed from a preferred important referent would only be present in the context of 
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 (n 35): Extensions of necessity that, if they can be demonstrated to be factually consistent with the case 
through evidence, will allow the defence to apply. 
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said important referent, and thus not infecting other invocations as far as the defence of necessity is 
concerned, (since the defence will not apply in these other invocations anyway). It is not obvious that 
the imputation of properties of this important referent is occurring, since the judges have no cause to 
leave the safe ground upon which all agree the defence applies. One might reasonably, on the face of 
it, further assume that LWGRHVQ¶WPDWWHULIWKH\DUHVLQFHDV,VD\DQ\SURSHUWLHVLQYRNHGE\D
particular referent would not escape to taint the use of NECESSITY in relation to other referents. In this 
way the defence operates somewhat like quarantine, where everyone locked in is immune to the 
disease, but would otherwise spread it should they interact with others. It is not inconceivable though, 
to imagine two catastrophic consequences of the error in question. Firstly, if the defence is ever 
extended to properly protect defendants in more trivial contexts quarantine will be breached, and the 
full brunt of the error will leak throughout attempts to apply the defence. Secondly, it is possible, and 
judicial commentary at least suggests this, that the common law development of the defence to 
include less serious instances has already been stunted as a result of this mistake! If NECESSITY has 
been presumed to primarily attach to certain extensions, it is not a large leap to imagine attempts to 
restrict it substantially within these boundaries, based on a superficial linguistic misconception. This 
is, of course, speculation, though by no means out of the question; and a striking possibility of the 
level of harm that can be caused by this mistake.  
Depending on how a sentence is phrased both NEED and NECESSITY are potentially interchangeable 
with one another,246 and our understanding of how the concepts work in a technical sense is improved 
when we consider the two concepts in the frame of their existence as modal operators. The two 
FRQFHSWVDUHLQWHUFKDQJHDEOHLQFHUWDLQFRQWH[WVLH³,QHHGVKHOWHU´DQG³7KHµQHFHVVLW\¶ RIVKHOWHU´, 
and they can be used to express the same idea in this way. For something to be necessary is for it to 
focus on a certain need; more than this, NEED and NECESSITY both function as modal operators. NEED 
is a modal operator of necessity, and this function they share. When understood through modal 
logic247 the role of both NEED and NECESSITY becomes clearer than observation of the two concepts 
can achieve alone.248 Modal operator has been claimed to attach to numerous expressions within 
different theories of logic,249 but within the most limited conception refers to NECESSITY and 
POSSIBILITY, with different concepts coming under these two expressions. NECESSITY includes 
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 Such as µIt is necessary for me to cURVVWKHURDGWRUHDFKP\KRXVH¶, or, µI need to cross the road to reach my 
KRXVH¶. 
247
 Which has important value in conducting some philosophical analysis, developed particularly by Carnap in 
Meaning and Necessity and µ0RGDOLWLHVDQG4XDQWLILFDWLRQ¶-RXUQDORI6\PEROLF/RJLF 
248
 Although this is sufficient by itself, it is beneficial to make the connection in a more sophisticated way 
through NEED and NEC(66,7<¶Vroles as modal operators. 
249
 For instance within deontic logic: obligatory, forbidden, and permitted. Temporal, and doxastic logic, etc. 
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concepts such as need, will, must250 and POSSIBILITY concepts such as might, could, maybe, etc. Other 
expressions that might be considered modal operators, (and accordingly have their own subset of 
concepts within them, with some overlap), are obligatory, permitted and forbidden within deontic 
logic. There are other types of modal operators within various logics, but all that need be explored for 
the purposes of my analysis here is the modal operator of NECESSITY.251  
Modal logic has great significance for analytic philosophy, (developed largely from the work of Saul 
Kripke252 and C.I. Lewis),253 though formal logic (in the sense that symbolism is the aim)254 is not 
within the purview of this thesis. Whether a modal proposition is true or not depends both on the 
modal operator that is being used and the correspondence of this proposition to reality.255 So if I live 
in Canada, and during winter I lose my coat,PD\PDNHWKHPRGDOSURSRVLWLRQµI need a new coat or 
,ZLOOEHXQDEOHWRJRRXWZLWKRXWEHLQJH[WUHPHO\FROG¶and the truth of this will be drawn from 
whether it is the case that it is necessary for me to have a new coat to fit the referent NEED attaches to 
here.256 In casual everyday language it would be usual to omit the latter of course, and VLPSO\VD\µ,
                                                   
250
 µ7KHJXLGLQJLGHDLQRXUFRQVWUXFWLRQVRIV\VWHPVRIPRGDOORJLFLVWKLVDSURSRVLWLRQSLVORJLFDOO\
necessary if and only if a sentence expressing p is logically true. That is to say, the modal concept of the logical 
necessity of a proposition and the semantical concept of the logical truth or analyticity of a sentence correspond 
WRHDFKRWKHU¶µ0RGDOLWLHVDQG4XDQWLILFDWLRQ¶ 34 
251
 Edward N. Zalta, Basic Concepts in Modal Logic, <http://mally.stanford.edu/notes.pdf>  accessed 15 
February 2014 
252
 Saul Kripke, µSemantical Considerations on Modal Logic¶(1963) 16 Acta Philosophica Fennica 83 
253
 Who founded modal logic in its initial form in A Survey of Symbolic Logic (University of California Press 
1918) and with Cooper Langford in Symbolic Logic (The Century Co 1932), although Aristotle explored it in a 
systematic way in De Interpretatione. (First published 350 B.C.E, OUP 1963) 
254
 For example ƑLVWKHV\PEROIRUµLWLVQHFHVVDU\WKDW¶DQG¸IRUµLWLVSRVVLEOHWKDW¶:KDW,VD\LQFKDSWHUWZR
on general pursuits of meaning and the aim of constructing an artificial logical language has relevance to this, 
yet the subtleties of such a language are clearly not of substantial concern to my argument.  
255
 I am here of course relying on a correspondence theory of truth, and necessarily avoiding the vast discourse 
surrounding general questions of truth-- ZKDWLVLWWRVD\VRPHWKLQJLVµWUXH¶HWF-- and more particular issues 
surrounding the concept such as those explored by Haack, (as seen in chapter two), and as explored by Kripke 
µ2XWOLQHRID7KHRU\RI7UXWK¶Journal of Philosophy 690. 
256
 $WDXWRORJ\VXFKDVµIf I am to have a new coat I neeGDQHZFRDW¶is an example of a modal proposition 
which can not be untrue, but tells us nothing useful. This proposition is necessarily true as opposed to 
contingently true- we can determine its truth value without investigation into the world, that is, it can be 
determined a priori, unlike the Canada coat example which can not. Contingent and necessary truths are related 
closely to the pairing analytic and synthetic statements (essentially revolving around truths that can be 
determined a prioir and those that require investigation into the world to determine), but to examine them further 
does not benefit my analysis. 
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QHHGDQHZFRDW¶ZKLFKLVXQSUREOHPDWLFbut in legal tests precision and understanding can be 
critical.  
We saw in chapter one attempts to restrict the use of NEED to certain important referents, and while 
they can be used in other ways, they are somehow stretched when applied to any various non-life 
threatening referents. 7RUHLWHUDWHLW¶VZRUWKUHYLVLWLQJKRZWKHmisconception can be accounted for at 
a basic level, the framework for which I set out in introduction of chapter one: firstly, a preferred, 
particular invocation of a concept is identified, that is considered to be especially important. Secondly, 
the features of this particular invocation are brought to mind. Thirdly, these features are transferred 
onto the concept itself, as opposed to the particular referent that initially evoked those features. 
Finally, the originally flexible and well understood concept is tainted in applications that are not 
consistent with the features of one, (seemingly random and personal), referent that concept might 
occasionally have. We encounter the same misunderstanding regarding NECESSITY. NECESSARY is 
capable of being used in relation to trivial extensions, but also µimportant¶ extensions. What 
NECESSARY FRQYH\VLVWKHLGHDWKDW;LVµUHTXLUHG¶RUµHVVHQWLDO¶WRDFKLHYH<;FDQEHDVPXQGDQH
as needing a pen to achieve Y (where Y= write notes in a lecture), or X can be needing a first aid kit 
to avoid Y (where Y= preventing blood loss resulting in death). In chapter two, part I, I set out the 
framework that my theory is preferable EHFDXVHLWµEHWWHUUHIOHFWVWKHZD\ZHDFWXDOO\XVHWKHWHUP¶.257 
While it is easy, prima facie, to simply claim any use outside this limited conception is a stretch of the 
FRQFHSWLWGRHVQ¶WVROYHDQ\SUREOHPVLWMXVWLJQRUHVWKHPE\DUWLILFLDOO\OLPLWLQJERWKFRQFHSWV. 
The following quote by C.S. Lewis shows the limited perception I have explored in a different 
context:258 
Friendship is unnecessary, like philosophy, like art... It has no survival value; rather it is one 
of those things that give value to survival.259 
This has rhetorical impact, but under scrutiny260, does not stand. It is not clear the way in which 
NECESSARY is WREHNHSWRXWLQWKHGDUNVKRXOGLWQRWIXOILOVRPHDUELWUDU\SHUFHSWLRQRIµKDYLQJ
VXUYLYDOYDOXH¶Rne could easily say friendship is necessary for happiness, or that at least a 
rudimentary understanding of philosophy is necessary for intellectual fulfilment and the performance 
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 (n 107) 
258
 I include it merely to demonstrate the existence, elsewhere, of the idea that necessity (and need) have this 
important meaning, and to develop further the role necessity plays as a modal operator though my counter 
examples. 
259
 Four Loves (Geoffrey Bles 1960) 
260
 ,WLVVLJQLILFDQWWRQRWHWKDWXQGHU%L[¶VDQDO\VLVRIQHHGIRUH[DPSOHDOWKRXJKKHGHDOVZLWKNEED not 
NECESSITY the same principle applies), this would not be highlighted as a mistake. 
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of successful arguments.261 The suggestion that NECESSITY and NEED apply exclusively to maintaining 
survival or the like is encountered here, as it often mistakenly is. This may initially seem pedantic, but 
in fact illustrates the problems one faces in any attempt to categorise anything within or without ones 
preferred conception. Such a categorisation could be tediously attempted but would always have 
holes; the relentless flexibility of language would find a way to seep through. Fortunately, there is no 
reason to since the whole perceived problem is resolved through a separation of concept and referent. 
It is not required to demonstrate that friendship and philosophy could be considered necessary for 
survival, as NECESSITY has no requirement that it be used only to describe meeting a requirement of 
survival. So friendship, for instance, could be described as necessary for happiness, without questions 
of survival even being relevant. This strange mistake is a bizarre but pervasive phenomenon, and one 
that is entirely solved by the simple act of distinguishing intension and extension. 
In the same vein, consider this H[WUDFWIURP'+/DZUHQFH¶VSRHPµHumiliation¶ 
 God, that I have no choice!  
 That my own fulfilment is up against me 
 Timelessly! 
 The burden of self-accomplishment! 
 The charge of fulfilment! 
 And God, that she is necessary! 
 Necessary, and I have no choice! 262 
Although a poem and analytic accuracy is not the prime aim by any means, when the character says 
NECESSARY, the implicit referent is something important, such as necessary to maintain happiness. It 
is significant that it is not to do with survival or requirements of life, demonstrating the random and 
personal nature of any personally important invocation of a concept. There is no consistency with 
preferred conceptions, simply individual perceptions of importance. The imputation of this 
importance onto NECESSITY, in invocations which have nothing to do with the singular preferred 
conception, is hardly a useful measurement of the concepts applicability. 
We now begin to move on to judicial treatment of NECESSITY. In line with what has been discussed 
thus far a high standard exists for the defence of necessity to apply: 
                                                   
261
 And even in the event of this arbitrary restriction, philosophy could have survival value in international 
communication between two nations with atomic bombs: an understanding of moral philosophy and 
humanitarian arguments may well be necessary for survival in these circumstances. 
262
 D.H. Lawrence, The Complete Poems of D.H. Lawrence, (Wordsworth Editions Ltd 1994) 162-163 
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Throughout the history of the common law, µQHFHVVLW\¶ has been a ground available as a 
defence in certain circumstances. The common law has allowed trespass to land or to goods in 
order to save life. It has allowed trespass in self-defence.263 
This high standard limits what particular extensions NECESSITY can have in the legal context of the 
defence. Its legal limitation here is similar to %L[¶VSURSRVHGFRQYHQWLRQDOPHDQLQJ, making it a 
fruitful point of comparison in analysing how we understand NEED and NECESSITY in a legal context. 
In the following extract from Esso,264 the importance of the circumstances the defence can apply is 
discussed in explicit detail: 
The defence of necessity would therefore have called for close examination if in fact it had 
been based solely on the saving of property and if in law I had thought that the plaintiffs' 
rights of ownership in the foreshore were unqualified by their proximity to the sea. But apart 
from the law, on which I have already expressed my view, the facts of this case, when 
examined, show that the peril said to justify the discharge of the cargo is that the ship was in 
imminent danger of breaking her back. The consequence of that would be not merely that the 
ship herself would become a total loss, but that in the circumstances of this case the lives of 
the crew would have been endangered. The safety of human lives belongs to a different scale 
of values from the safety of property. The two are beyond comparison and the µQHFHVVLW\¶ for 
saving life has at all times been considered a proper ground for inflicting such damage as may 
be necessary upon another's property.265  
This quote demonstrates an agreeable proposition; that human life is to be valued above property, and 
accordingly, due to the reluctance for the law to allow a wide applicability of the defence of necessity, 
the defence will be limited to these extreme circumstances.266 Whether the defence of necessity was 
available in Esso depended on whether the discharge of the cargo was to solely prevent damage to the 
VKLSRUWRDOVRVDYHWKHOLYHVRIWKHFUHZµµ(N)HFHVVLW\¶ NQRZVQRODZ¶267 and the law is willing to 
recognise this, within circumstances that are severe enough. The maxim, however, that NECESSITY 
knows no law, only usually applies in life threatening circumstances. The general defence of necessity 
would not automatically fail LIVRPHWKLQJOLNHµWRVDYHOLYHV¶ZDVQRWWKHH[WHQVLRQ of NECESSITY in 
an individual case, but as the judge in Esso VD\VLWZLOOFDOOIRUµFORVHH[DPLQDWLRQ¶LILWLVIn Re A 
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 Southwark London Borough Council v Williams and Another [1971] Ch. 734 737 
264
 Esso Petroleum Co. Ltd. v. South port Corporation [1956] A.C. 218 
265
 Esso 227 
266
 R v Kitson [1955] 39 Cr App R 66 
267
 Southwark 737 
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(Children) (Conjoined Twins: Surgical Separation)268 Brooke LJ quotes Sir James Stephen, saying the 
GHIHQFHVKRXOGRQO\DSSO\ZKHUHDQDFWZDVµdone only in order to avoid consequences which could 
not otherwise be avoided, and which, if they had followed, would have inflicted upon him or upon 
RWKHUVZKRPKHZDVERXQGWRSURWHFWLQHYLWDEOHDQGLUUHSDUDEOHHYLO¶.269 Such is the important nature 
of the circumstances of which the defence of necessity will apply to. 
A quote from the issues raised by needs assessments in chapter three ties in with the idea that some 
extensions of NECESSITY and NEED are simply considered to be more important than others: 
(R)eferring to the assessment of needs for community care services, indicates that the process 
is concerned with the identification of the need for some service that can be provided by the 
local authority, not some basic human need such as the need for sustenance, shelter, etc.270  
:KDWLVVXUHO\PHDQWE\µEDVLFQHHG¶KHUHLVFRQVLGHULQJWKHH[DPSOHV of a basic need offered, 
relatively FRQVLVWHQWZLWKZKDW%L[UHIHUVWRDVµEDVLFPLQLPDOUHTXLUHPHQWVRIOLIH¶ While it is fine 
for these notions to be a little vague,271 distinguishing between a basic human need and the type of 
needs a local authority may otherwise provide for a patient would in many cases be arbitrary.272 This 
is so in a similar way the phalakros paradox273 demonstrates problems with vagueness: like the 
balding man, it is not FOHDUDWZKDWSRLQWDUHZHWRFRQVLGHUDQHHGµEDVLFµFRUH¶RUDQ\ other means of 
articulating the idea.274 The separation of two different types of NEED and NECESSITY, important and 
unimportant, clearly occurs but it is no way helpful to do so, and needlessly complicates (potentially 
derailing) the linguistic and legal application of very simple concepts. The whole issue leaks into legal 
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 [2001] 2 WLR 480 
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 James Stephen, A Digest of the Criminal Law (4th edn Macmillan and co 1887) 24-25 
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 That a more specific referent is possible is not an issue. A restriction of all invocations to a general heading 
(such as survival) includes a huge range of potential extensions; but what matters is that they all cohere within a 
relatively limited general category which is given prominence in the mind of the speaker.   
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 The primary problem is not that the notion of a basic human need, or something of the like, is vague: 
7LPRWK\:LOOLDPV9DJXHQHVVLQ5HDOLW\¶ (n 87); 0DWWL(NOXQGµ5HFHQW:RUNRQ9DJXHQHVV¶ (n 88). It is rather 
that the issues caused by this vagueness, when attempting to categorise exactly what is to be considered a basic 
human need, are completely unnecessary and sidestepped through attention to intension and extension.  
273
 The thought experiment concerning a balding man, at what point is a man bald if you remove a hair from a 
full head one by one, DVLQLWLDOO\FRQFHLYHGE\(XEXOLGHV%HUWLO5ROIµ6RULWHV¶6\QWKHVH)RU
IXUWKHUGLVFXVVLRQVHH0D[%ODFNµ5HDVRQLQJZLWK/RRVH&RQFHSWV¶'LDORJXH One might fairly 
DVNDWZKDWSRLQWDµEDVLFQHHG¶FURVVWKe boundary into a non-basic one; the dichotomy creates an unneeded 
lack of clarity. 
274
 7KLVFULWLFLVPLVTXLWHDSDUWIURPWKDWMXVWGLVFXVVHGWKDWRQH¶VSUHIHUUHGFRnception is likely to be entirely 
LQFRQVLVWHQWZLWKVRPHRQHHOVH¶VGHVSLWHERWKbeing relatively important. 
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rhetoric in a pervasive way and is as simple as making a distinction between NEED and what NEED is 
being predicated of in a particular instance. Some strange hierarchy of NEED and NECESSITY based on 
the particular extension that is being employed only serves, as I have shown, to confuse the otherwise 
intuitive idea of how the concepts actually work.  
Part II- Judicial Understanding of µ1HFHVVLW\¶  
The problems assaulting NEED are seemingly less liable to occur regarding the defence of necessity; or 
at the least they are invisible, hidden within the restricted, exclusively important referents the defence 
applies to; potentially lurking should the defence ever apply generally beyond its current limited 
remit. Despite this distinct possibility, the defence demonstrates that where the extension is not 
vulnerable to manipulation, errors in language, (and consequently judgments), are less likely to occur. 
In such cases judges have a firmer grip on linguistic issues that might otherwise hound a trial, as they 
do in needs assessments. Firstly, the high threshold imposed by the defence of necessity, in 
circumstances where life is in danger, means that it has an exclusively important referent. Secondly, 
this inflexibility of what circumstances the defence of necessity can apply to limits potential mistakes; 
since the extensions NECESSITY is capable of having in the defence are so limited, there is little scope 
for error. It could be limited to extensions that are considered to be less important (i.e. property 
damage), not loss of life, and this point would remain partly true. However, that it is limited and 
consistent with this supposed µLPSRUWDQW¶FRQFHSWLRQ of NEED and NECESSITY only makes it more 
remarkable in contrast with the points made in the earlier chapters of this thesis. Firstly, where the 
extension of NEED or NECESSITY is limited within a legal principle of some sort,275 with little variety 
of invocation, mistakes revolving around this are less likely, which can be seen through relative 
judicial competence around linguistic issues, that in other contexts cause confusion. Whether this 
competence is due to actual judicial awareness, or a symptom of the restricted potential extensions 
within the defence, is not important for the sake of this point. If the mistake is occurring but 
invisible,276 due to the limited potential referents, the judicial understanding is still present; and can be 
throughout all its legal invocations. Secondly, the circumstances in which the defence is available, i.e. 
life threatening circumstances, are relevant to what I have argued throughout this paper: that where 
one conceives of a preferred referent for a concept, it is not the case that this meaning is more or less 
conventional than other applications of the concept. It is more the case that the importance of one 
referent in one context is being imputed onto NECESSITY and NEED themselves as concepts, even 
when utilised elsewhere. (Or, as I say, imputed from an extension of which these concepts are capable 
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 Such as needs assessments or the defence of necessity 
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 As explained in full on pages 69-70.  
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of being predicated, to the intension). This is not an issue in the defence of necessity where the 
available extensions of NECESSITY are limited to these important referents alone.  
The lack of immediate linguistic problems, comparably with what was discussed previously, supports 
the value of distinguishing the intension and extension of important legal concepts like NEED where 
there are multiple and varied available extensions. The clarity within the defence, whether accidental 
and hidden or genuine, can be achieved with any legal concept through appreciating the difference 
between the relevant concept and what the concept is predicated of.  
The availability of the defence is well established within these µLPSRUWDQW¶ parameters, and is 
demonstrated by Esso Petroleum Co. Ltd v South port Corporation when the judgment is quoted in 
Southwark London Borough Council v Williams and Another277 to make the following point: 
(N)ecessity as a defence was considered in Esso Petroleum Co. Ltd. v. South port 
Corporation [1956] A.C. 218. "The safety of human lives belongs to a different scale of 
values from the safety of property": per Devlin J. at p. 228. It is established that if at a 
particular time there is proved to be imminent danger to life, steps that involve trespass are 
justified. Neither the cases relating to the protection of goods, nor the right of way of 
µQHFHVVLW\¶ are relevant here. The doctrine which justifies taking steps to save life does not 
extend to injury to health.278 
The court in Southwark here distinguishes between what referents NECESSITY ought to have in the 
defence of necessity. Whether to save lives or prevent injury, these two general referents lead to 
opposite legal outcomes. With attention being paid to what the extension of NECESSITY is in such 
cases there is little scope for mistakes in language having negative effects on the legal outcome of 
cases. It is helpful to contrast what is said here with the approach taken by the deputy judge in 
McDonald279, who took the specific extension of NEED within the needs assessment and attempted to 
FKDQJHLWDQGLQWHUSUHWLWLQDJHQHUDOZD\ORRNLQJDW0F'RQDOG¶VJHQHUDOneed opposed to the 
specific need identified in the assessment. The potential to substitute an alternative extension of NEED 
to reach an alternate legal conclusion about whether something was a need is much less present with 
the role NECESSITY plays in the defence of necessity. There is more to be learned about this if we re-
examine the above quote from Esso: 
The defence of necessity would therefore have called for close examination if in fact it had 
been based solely on the saving of property and if in law I had thought that the plaintiffs' 
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rights of ownership in the foreshore were unqualified by their proximity to the sea. But apart 
from the law, on which I have already expressed my view, the facts of this case, when 
examined, show that the peril said to justify the discharge of the cargo is that the ship was in 
imminent danger of breaking her back. The consequence of that would be not merely that the 
ship herself would become a total loss, but that in the circumstances of this case the lives of 
the crew would have been endangered. The safety of human lives belongs to a different scale 
of values from the safety of property. The two are beyond comparison and the µQHFHVVLW\¶ for 
saving life has at all times been considered a proper ground for inflicting such damage as may 
be necessary upon another's property.280  
Likewise, the defendant in R. v Quayle (Barry)281 invoked the defence in support of his growing of 
cannabis for medical conditions, and it was rejected. Jane Creaton makes a relevant point in a case 
commentary:282 
The Court of Appeal's judgment clarifies the uncertainty over the availability and extent of 
the defence of medical µQHFHVVLW\¶ in drugs cases. Although the court conceived of some 
unlikely scenarios where defence of necessity would be available (e.g. a person being forced 
to smoke cannabis at gunpoint), the general rule was that it is not available as a defence.283 
The particularly relevant point here is the unlikely situation of a person being forced to smoke 
cannabis at gunpoint. That this is the case is due to the requirement of extreme circumstances for the 
defence of necessity to be relied upon. However, while NECESSITY can not typically be relied on in 
different contexts within the legal defence, in conventional language it is perfectly capable of being 
predicated of a myriad of extensions. This (accidental or not) awareness of the potential applications 
of NECESSITY allows the court to, clearly and without undue linguistic confusion, explore the 
substantial issues284 before it. In cases that concern the defence of necessity so much revolves around 
what the extension of what was necessary is (although, no more than it does in needs assessments), 
that errors are not affordable;285 and this was precisely what Esso boiled down toµ,QGLVFKDUJLQJWKH
cargo the ship, he contends, was doing no more than was reasonably necessary for the safety of the 
crew and of the ship and cargo¶.286 µ7KHVDIHW\RIWKHFUHZDQGRIWKHVKLSDQGFDUJR¶LVWKHUHOHYDQW
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extension of which NECESSITY is predicated here, and the verdict depends on it being the case 
factually (and least with regard to the safety of the crew).  
The famous case The Queen v Dudley and Stephens revolved around the defence of necessity and 
involved three men stranded at sea in a boat with rapidly diminishing food supplies. Two of the 
passengers decided the only way to survive was to kill and eat the third member of the group: the 
cabin boy. Four days after they committed the act they were rescued by a passing vessel, tried and 
convicted for murder, and consequently put to death. They attempted to rely on the general defence of 
necessity as a legal justification for their actions. Lord Coleridge had this to say in his judgment: 
Now it is admitted that the deliberate killing of this unoffending and unresisting boy was 
clearly murder, unless the killing can be justified by some well-recognised excuse admitted 
by the law. It is further admitted that there was in this case no such excuse, unless the killing 
ZDVMXVWLILHGE\ZKDWKDVEHHQFDOOHGµµQHFHVVLW\¶¶287 
Dudley offers a straightforward extension for NECESSITY and its simplicity helps avoid talking cross 
purposes with regard to other potential extensions (as occurred in McDonald )288 or playing with 
language to achieve the verdict a judge desires. That is because it is obviously to survive. The 
question is, or is near enough, was it necessary to kill and eat the cabin boy to survive/avoid starving 
to death? That this is clear from the offset goes a long way to offsetting some of the confusion that 
arises in McDonald, as there is no risk of playing with language to subtly change the referent and 
claim that it is or is not necessary accordingly. Whether a judge wants to allow the defence of 
necessity to apply in these circumstances, (or, in McDonald, what level of support the authority 
should give considering their resources, etc),289 is clearly not in the purview of this paper, but its 
successful consideration in a court room requires that there be no mistakes in precisely what 
NECESSITY is legally and factually predicated of, and what consequences this has. A clear and 
agreeable extension must be arrived at before productive discourse on the applicability of the defence 
can be had. Proof of whether an act was or was not necessary, once this has been considered (often it 
is a given, as in Dudley) is a separate question, but relies on this being achieved.  
Despite this general understanding and simplification of what the extension of NECESSITY is in a 
particular case, the concept still encounters confusion. In Dudley Lord Coleridge, CJ, toward the end 
of his judgment asks the question:  
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Was it more necessary to kill him (the cabin boy) than one of the grown men? The answer 
PXVWEH³1R´.290  
This is, whether intended or not, an abuse of language to make an ethical point in a rhetorical fashion. 
To say nothing on whether the law should protect the defendants here, whether it was more necessary 
to kill the cabin boy depends on the extension NECESSITY has, and if one phrased it so³,QRUGHUWR
achieve the highest odds of survival for two of the three men, it is necessary to kill the weakest and 
OHDVWOLNHO\WRVXUYLYH´WKHQLWTXLWHFOearly could be described as more necessary to kill the cabin boy 
over one of the grown men. But NECESSITY could be predicated of any number of other reasonable 
REMHFWVVXFKDV³,IRQHPXVWGLHLQRUGHUWRSURORQJWKHVXUYLYDORIWKHRWKHUVIRUDVORQJDVpossible, 
it is necessary to sacULILFHRQHRIWKHODUJHUPHQ´In convicting the men, using necessary in this 
rhetorical fashion is unfair; the two defendants could quite sensibly and fairly describe it as being 
more necessary to kill the weaker younger man over either of them;291 the cabin boy had less chance 
of surviving even with food. Lord Coleridge is misusing NECESSITY to make an ethical position (that 
valuing one life over another is wrong) appear more than an ethical position by claiming that it is not 
even necessary to do so. But by this stipulated definition one could quite easily describe it as 
necessary within the parameters offered. If this faulty line of reasoning is accepted it leaves the 
potential for rhetorical excess to trump linguistic accuracy at the expense of the lives of defendants.  
Like Lord Coleridge, in the previous quote, when participants in a conversation argue about whether 
something was necessary or not, what is often the case is they are arguing about whether it is morally 
correct or not to do something. The conversation, after A does something particularly cruel or petty to 
B (i.e. kicking him after knocking him over with a punch) may SURPSW&WRVD\VRPHWKLQJOLNHµstop 
LWWKDWLVQ¶WQHFHVVDU\¶This simplified example is identical in general principle to what Lord 
Coleridge is doing in his moral evaluation of the actions of the defendants. The significant point C is 
putting forward is not about NECESSITY, but about the referent of NECESSITY in this instance: kicking 
someone whHQWKH\DUHGRZQOLWHUDOO\%\$¶VVWDQGDUGVLWPD\EHSHUIHFWO\ZHOOGHVFULEHGDV
necessary, if the requirement is to humiliate or cause further pain to his victim. If A disagrees with C 
on this they are not disagreeing about what is necessary or not, (and if they are they are just talking 
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past one another),292 they are disagreeing about whether A should or should not be doing what he is 
doing. This can be applied to limitless examples, but the point remains the same throughout any of 
them, and can also be the case with NEED. A rich businessman may purchase a Ferrari, and 
friends/colleagues/strangers may question µ%XWGR\RXUHDOO\QHHGWKDW"¶ If NEED is predicated of 
having a very impressive car for whatever reason, then sensibly the businessman could reply with 
µ<HV, ,GR¶,I, instead, NEED is predicated of getting to work in a reasonably economic fashion, then 
no. The same applies to the purchase of a yacht for the sake of enjoyment, etc. What is actually being 
stated by the person asking if you really need these things is making, in part, an evaluative proposition 
of potentially varying qualities; maybe expressing envy, or disgust for what they consider to be greed, 
etc. What is in dispute is the referent of NEED that is in mind: that people should be minimalistic in 
their travelling expenses, not be excessive in their expenditure when many people are starving in the 
world, etc. The argument about whether the businessman needs the new car or yacht is simply a 
vehicle, (no pun intended), for this discussion, and if it is actually about NEED or NECESSITY, then they 
are simply talking past one another.   
The consequence of errors here can be severe; for Dudley and Stephens, it was a life or death issue. 
As Bix says in the conclusion to Law and Language, µ%HFDuse we only rarely have an Oliver Wendell 
Holmes, Jr or a Felix Cohen to keep us in line, we need to learn to do the important work 
ourselves¶.293 And that: 
We may never entirely escape the tendency of our own language to mislead us, but clarity in 
thought and analysis is something towards which we should struggle constantly, and with 
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Conclusion  
I have evidenced my core premise: that philosophical and linguistic problems in law result from a lack 
of appreciation for the distinction between a concept and its referent in extension. The consequences 
of this lack of appreciation are varied and numerous, reaching across a wide array of concepts and 
legal fields. The claim is significant not because of the notion intension and extension itself, but 
because inattention to it demonstrably causes harmful reasoning in important contexts. Alarming 
abandon of the division turns the otherwise simple into the significant. In order to best attend to the 
issues at hand I separated consideration of legal theory and practice, as well as the relevant wider 
ideas engaged by my inquiry. The structure of this thesis facilitated my approach in handling the 
diverse and sometimes complex issues raised. It was important to begin at the top, so to speak, with 
chapter one investigating prominent legal theory. The errors in question are not localised to a singular 
or niche area of law, in fact they are seemingly wide spread; and beginning my inquiry with %L[¶V
contributions to legal theory immediately raises the question of where these potentially pervasive 
misunderstandings may otherwise be encountered. %L[¶VDUWLFOHKROGV the primary aim of exploring 
the consequences of our misuse of language, and is conducted by a significant figure in modern 
analytic legal theory. My investigations in chapter one led to many general issues being raised that 
needed addressing, and strongly prompted the consideration of other theorists. Both of these are 
achieved in the second chapter, establishing a strong framework with which to tackle the problems 
besetting case law; which I moved on to do in two distinct ways in chapters three and four. My claims 
are not restricted to NEED or NECESSITY alone, but they are lucrative focus points in legal theory and 
case law. They make for a strong focus as what is said about the concepts themselves is worthwhile in 
its own regard, yet the ideas discussed prompt a wider significance for the errors under scrutiny. I will 
here succinctly redraw the main points from each chapter, and following this, tie the themes together. 
This will necessarily involve returning to the issues with broad brush strokes; the precise subtleties of 
many of the points are not appropriate here. 
%L[¶VDUWLFOH, µLaw and Language: How Words Mislead Us¶ contributed significant motivation for 
pursuing this inquiry. Brian Bix is a prominent figure in contemporary conceptual analysis, and his 
article was written with the intent of clearing up linguistic issues surrounding a variety of legal 
concepts. However, it suffered from some key failures revolving around his neglect of intension and 
extension. I began to develop, in relation to his specific mistake, a framework with which other 
linguistic difficulties could be applied to and resolved. This framework being that, firstly, a preferred 
and limited invocation of a concept is ascribed importance, (typically based on strong emotive 
associations toward the particular referent being relied upon). Secondly, the characteristics of this 
preferred referent are brought to mind. Thirdly, these characteristics are transferred onto the concept 
itself in intension, as opposed to the particular referent that initially evoked those features. Finally, the 
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originally flexible and well understood concept is tainted in applications that are not consistent with 
the characteristics of one, (seemingly random and personal), referent that concept might occasionally 
have. Ultimately then, features of an object of which a concept is capable of being predicated in 
extension are associated with the concept itself in intension; leading to misunderstandings concerning 
its application in contexts that do not cohere with the preferred invocation. We saw how Bix fits into 
this idea, with his preference for NEED DWWDFKLQJWRPHHWLQJµHYHQEDVLFPLQLPDOUHTXLUHPHQWVRIOLIH¶
He also encountered the same problem regarding FREEDOM, and exploration of his error in part II 
brought us into contact with philosophy surrounding vagueness in language. 8OWLPDWHO\%L[¶VHUURUV
were caused by not keeping separate the dual nature of NEED; that it has an intension and a variety of 
referents in extension of which they may be predicated.  
Chapter two split into three parts to examine in more depth the various philosophical notions which 
particularly hold to my analysis. Part I addressed the point of conducting conceptual analysis in the 
way I do and examined how the notion of talking past one another does not block the applicability of 
my arguments. Part II of the same chapter investigated how the philosophy discussed here in relation 
to NEED, and NECESSITY, is widely applicable. This is demonstrated in part by the treatment given to 
these ideas by other philosophers. An (initially) surprisingly large amount of philosophical discourse 
has suffered needlessly for inattention to intension and extension; in both coherence theories and 
regarding TRUTH. Though, after consideration in this piece, it is not a shock that this is the case; if the 
mistake is being made at the highest levels of conceptual analysis by Bix for Jurisprudence, in an 
article dedicated to solving linguistic issues, it is probable WKDWLWLVKDSSHQLQJHOVHZKHUH3HWKLFN¶V 
DQG+DDFN¶V research shows that this is so with theorists in other academic fields. Part III examined 
why esoteric questions of meaning do not hold to my argument, as it is more fundamental than such 
questions and concerns: quite simply: the value in distinguishing what a concept is capable of affixing 
to and the concept in abstract. I explored the relationship between key concepts that relate to intension 
and extension, (such as sense and reference), to clear up the concepts I rely on in articulating my 
criticisms in this piece.  
It became foreseeable, at this point, that the neglect present in theory is also likely occurring in court 
as well. The potential trickle-down effect of this mistake, from theory to cases, is to be expected, and 
my thesis is only able to conduct analysis of some key theorists and cases if it is to be sufficiently 
thorough. Still, I suggest, through these examples, that the problem is likely far reaching and ought to 
be investigated beyond the remit this thesis allows. I have shown how the mistake is the same in 
relation to various concepts such as NEED, NECESSITY, FREEDOM, COHERENCE and TRUTH. This is 
more than sufficient to raise the serious question of whether other concepts in other fields, (as well as 
the same concepts under consideration here), unnecessarily remain misunderstood, and what unknown 
consequences this may have. Though the errors under investigation in this thesis are of a similar 
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nature to HDFKRWKHUWKHFRQVHTXHQFHVGLIIHUZLWKYDU\LQJGHJUHHVRIVHYHULW\LQHDFKLQVWDQFH%L[¶V
misunderstanding leads him to make erroneous criticisms of American alimony law; not as 
immediately serious a result as we may see elsewhere, but noteworthy due to the context in which the 
mistake is made. Similarly for Haack and Pethick, the theory they criticise has wound itself up in 
knots and needs attention through the scope of intension and extension. The concepts I examine are all 
relied on in significant legal contexts; rife misunderstanding within dedicated theory potentially raises 
alarms for judicial understanding. We see more directly damaging results in needs assessments, with 
the functional reliability of the assessment under threat for those receiving care and social welfare. 
Similarly, the defence of necessity may seriously suffer from subtle and insidious problems, of which 
I return to in summary shortly. We have seen that, despite the similar nature of the issues besetting 
each example, the complications that arise are varied and in need of clarification.  
Chapter three directly applied what has been said of legal theory and philosophical analysis to case 
law. Needs assessments are fertile ground for the type of mistakes this paper explores, as they involve 
a legal principle which relies heavily on the language used. Judicial commentary either suffered from 
or ignored linguistic issues that, if left unchecked, allow for the subtle re-categorisation of an 
LQGLYLGXDO¶VQHHGVZKHQWKH\VHHNWo rely on their original needs assessment in or out of court. The 
problem, if not properly analysed, causes needs assessments to be unenforceable by claimants where 
they would otherwise be likely to succeed. Confusion presents itself within key community care 
decisions such as McDonald, Daykin and Barry; at best getting in the way of the real legal issues 
being discussed, and at worst complicating them to the point mistakes are made in law. I also 
examined how two different stages of assessing an individual¶Vneeds, (identifying a need and meeting 
a need), prompt confusion if one does not account for a distinction between the referent NEED is 
attaching to in extension and NEED as a concept in intension. We saw how, (in both chapter three and 
four, which I consider next), it is possible to fall into false disagreements about the nature of NEED in 
intension, (what NEED µPHDQV¶ZKHQVXFKGLVDJUHHPHQW is actually caused by the referent in dispute. 
In this way participants will talk past one another, avoiding the root of their contention; a formidable 
concern should it occur in legal discourse.  
Chapter four takes the criminal defence of necessity to provide contrast with the cases considered that 
surround community care. The relationship between NEED and NECESSITY is intimate; both in formal 
logic and natural language; providing opportunity to explore the nature of NEED and how its varied 
application is explained. Their role as modal operators was considered within the frame of my inquiry. 
Additionally, judicial commentary around the defence informed us further of how particularly 
important extensions of NECESSITY might influence our thinking. When potential referents are highly 
restricted, and constrained within what one may consider to be a particularly important extension, 
mistakes are, naturally, less likely to occur. That said, we explored how issues that might otherwise 
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beset the defence of necessity are potentially invisible. The referents NECESSITY might have are 
limited to things like prevention of serious harm or death, so any imputation of features that properly 
are evoked from these referents onto NECESSITY itself are, on the face of it, unproblematic, since the 
context makes the features relevant anyway. As we saw, this might seem to be without consequence 
for the defence, but there are a few points of consideration that arise out of it. Firstly, if the defence is 
ever extended to less important contexts, other than preventing serious harm or death, the issues that 
otherwise rest harmlessly will rear their ugly heads. Secondly, and more speculatively, the 
misconceptions around NECESSITY might currently stunt the growth of the defence in common law to 
include less serious referents. After all, if necessity is supposed to inherently relate to something akin 
to survival it is no stretch at all to imagine it should only protect a defendant when acting in interests 
of his survival. This subtle linguistic turn leaves us facing the possibility that defendants, who might 
otherwise be protected, (rightly or wrongly), are left defenceless.  
On top of this, judicial competence, in the application of the defence within its current boundaries, is 
informative in contrast with needs assessments. The clarity maintained in the defence, (even if it is 
incidental and accidental due to an artificial legal restriction), is achievable in all legal invocations of 
NEED and NECESSITY, simply by attention to the concept itself as a separate entity to the referent it 
attaches to in extension. NECESSITY also provided a strong ground of comparison for the points made 
prior to this in the thesis, and allows exploration of how NEED functions, (through the close similarity 
of the two concepts), in a different context.  
To display the wide applicability of the ideas discussed in solving philosophical problems I relied on a 
broad range of legal areas; both in legal theory and case law. Chapter one devoted space to family and 
contract law, and chapter two legal and philosophical theory. Chapter three concerned social welfare 
and public law, and chapter four criminal law; it is partially by relying on this wide array of practices 
that the applicability of the philosophy discussed is demonstrated. This wide application is not 
superficial; I deploy the intension and extension distinction in meaningful examples to solve problems 
in all but chapter two, in which I instead exhibit how others have done the same. Sufficient 
demonstration of my position is well satisfied by applying intension and extension to these distinct 
and diverse areas. This assortment goes a considerable way in showing the general applicability of the 
theory, within any relevant philosophical problem that may arise for law. Consequently, while the 
misconceptions NEED and NECESSITY currently face are troublesome in their own right, it is far from a 
weak speculation to make that what I am able to discuss in this thesis only begins to scrape the surface 
of the problems that are caused by a neglect of intension and extension.  
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